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The Evolving Policy Landscape for Technology Transfer 
from Public Research Organisations in South Africa 
Abstract 
Rosemary Wolson 
February 2008 
This dissertation examines the policy environment for technology transfer in 
South African public research organisations (PROs), with special emphasis 
on pending legislation designed to regulate the protection and exploitation of 
intellectual property rights from publicly financed research. The context is 
set by defining what is meant by the term 'technology transfer'. The rationale 
behind the decision of governments to support technology transfer and 
PROs to engage in technology transfer is discussed, and some of the 
controversies associated with PRO technology transfer are described. 
Selected policy options for encouraging technology transfer which have 
been adopted internationally are compared. The state of technology 
transfer in South Africa is summarised, and relevant elements of the policy 
environment are highlighted, in order to provide background to and 
contextualise the discussion of the pending legislation. The pending 
legislation is assessed in some detail. Drawing on lessons learned from the 
literature, from experiences elsewhere and on an understanding of the 
South African technology transfer environment, a set of recommendations is 
developed, in an effort to contribute to strengthening both the policy process 
and the policy framework itself. 
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THE EVOLVING POLICY LANDSCAPE FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM PRO'S IN SOUTH AFRICA 
CHAPTER 1: 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM PUBLIC RESEARCH 
ORGANISATIONS: SETTING THE SCENE 
1.1 Introduction 
This dissertation deals with the subject of technology transfer from 
university or government-supported research institutions (which will 
collectively be referred to as 'public research organisations', or PROs, for 
the purposes of the dissertation), focusing more specifically on an evolving 
set of policy interventions aimed at improving the technology transfer 
activity of South African PROs. In order to set the scene, the dissertation 
begins by introducing the technology transfer process and highlighting 
some of the key characteristics of institutional technology transfer 
objectives, policies, operating models and activities. 
1.2 What is Technology Transfer? 
Technology transfer from a PRO comprises a range of mechanisms 
whereby knowledge and technology generated in the course of research 
are passed on to others. These mechanisms need not be mutually 
exclusive. The most common form of technology transfer in the university 
environment is via published literature, where information is placed in the 
public domain and made available to anyone with an interest in it. 
Conference presentations serve a similar purpose, but may not reach as 
wide an audience. Research collaborations and sponsored research allow 
collaborating parties and sponsors access to research results. Academics 
who consult to industry pass on know-how derived from their university 
research. Graduates enter employment taking with them skills and 
knowledge gained from participating in university research projects during 
their degrees. But the term 'technology transfer' is often used in a narrower 
sense, specifically in relation to the licensing or assignment to industry of 
1 
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ROSEMARY A WOLSON MPHIL 
intellectual property produced from university research. This dissertation 
will address the latter form of technology transfer, which sees potentially 
useful research results generated in PROs transferred to outside entities to 
exploit them commercially and/or for social benefit. 
While variations are possible at each stage, the process typically proceeds 
broadly along the following lines. Researchers employed by a PRO are 
often required to assign ownership of intellectual property they generate in 
the course of their research to their employer (whether in terms of 
employment law, institutional intellectual property policies or both). On 
achieving a research outcome with potential application outside the 
institution (often simply referred to as 'developing an invention'), the 
researcher, or inventor, will make an 'invention disclosure' to the 
institution's technology transfer office (TTO),1 describing the invention, 
including the problem it solves and the advantages it offers over competing 
technology. The TTO is responsible for evaluating the invention in an effort 
to ascertain whether it (a) is patentable and (b) offers good prospects for 
commercialisation (opportunities for social impact are increasingly being 
considered too). The patentability evaluation involves ensuring that the 
subject matter meets the legal requirements for patentability, and includes 
carrying out patent and literature searches. The commercial evaluation is 
intended inter alia to determine the extent of the potential market for the 
technology concerned, and the possibility of finding suitable licensees or 
investors to take the technology to market. 
Where inventions satisfy the requirements for patentability, the TTO will 
instruct a patent attorney to draft a patent specification, and a patent 
application will be filed naming the institution as applicant, and the 
researchers involved as inventors. The TTO will then proceed to market 
the technology to potential licensees (for example, companies who use, 
develop, manufacture or sell similar technologies), or investigate the 
1 The names of such an office or unit vary from institution to institution. Common 
alternative nomenclature includes phrases such as 'technology licensing', 'business 
development', 'industry liaison' or 'intellectual property' in the unit names. 
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viability of setting up a spin-out company to take the technology to market 
(in which the institution and/or researcher might take an equity stake), 
which will require sourcing start-up capital. A researcher may take a 
management or advisory role in such a company. In the event that a deal 
for the exploitation of the technology is successfully concluded, revenue 
generated as a result (eg through license fees or sale of equity) is shared 
according to a defined formula between designated groupings within the 
institution (typically allocated between some central fund and the inventors' 
faculty and/or department) and the responsible researchers in their 
personal capacities. 
Technologies may be licensed on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis. 
Where PRO technology is licensed at an early (embryonic) stage, requiring 
further investment from a licensee to develop a market-ready product 
(which is frequently the case), exclusive rights might be required to induce 
the licensee to make the necessary investment in the knowledge that it has 
some protection from competitors (Colyvas et aI, 2002). Many policies 
promote non-exclusive licensing as a preferred option when this is feasible 
(which will typically be in the case of a 'ready-to-use' or 'off-the-shelf' 
technology), as this can facilitate wider practice of the technology. A no 
will assess which mechanism is likely to be more effective in bringing the 
technology to market, and which will best promote the use of the 
technology in the public interest, on a case-by-case basis. Where 
exclusive licenses are granted, this is generally on the condition that the 
licensee undertakes to practice the licensed invention diligently, 
encouraged through the inclusion of contractual terms dealing, for 
example, with minimum payments, loss of exclusivity and achievement of 
milestones (Council On Governmental Relations, 1993). 
Factors which affect the license fees a PRO technology might attract 
include the type of technology, the research and development (R&D) 
investment to date, its stage of development, potential market size, 
expected profit margin, level of risk, strength of patent protection and 
projected cost of bringing a product to market, industry standards for 
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similar technologies, and the scope of the license (in respect of territories, 
fields of use and degree of exclusivity). The fact that PRO technologies 
are usually licensed at an early stage, requiring substantial investment from 
the licensee to develop a product to a market-ready stage (and thus an 
appetite for risk), means that license fees are often not very high (Council 
On Governmental Relations, 1993). 
1.3 Intellectual Property Ownership by PROs 
While alternative approaches exist, this model usually assumes ownership 
of intellectual property by the PRO, rather than by individual researchers, 
government or the licensee. This represents a growing trend. Much of the 
policy development in this area in different countries (as discussed in 
Chapter 4) has had the common goal of ensuring that ownership of 
intellectual property derived from publicly funded research vests in the 
PRO, although respective departure points for such ownership positions in 
different places varied significantly prior to the relevant policy changes. For 
example, in several European countries, professors traditionally had the 
right to own the intellectual property developed in the course of their 
university research activities. In the United States of America (USA), the 
federal government used to own much of the intellectual property 
generated as a result of federally-funded research projects. Various 
reasons are put forward to support the position of PRO ownership of 
intellectual property, as a preferred option over ownership by other 
participants in the technology transfer process. 
1.3. 1 Vis-a-vis researchers 
It is believed that PROs will be more likely to ensure that the broader public 
interest is protected than individual researchers, who might be motivated 
by self-interest. Also, where there are multiple inventors, a prospective 
licensee would have to negotiate with each individual, who might not agree 
with one another, which at worst could prevent a deal from being reached, 
and at best would involve delays and additional transaction costs. 
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Individual researchers might not have the interest, capacity or resources to 
market their technologies. Most policies provide for release of rights to 
inventors in the event that the PRO does not elect to take title to the 
intellectual property concerned. 
1.3.2 Vis-a-vis government 
Industry does not generally view government agencies as good commercial 
partners, as they are thought to be too far removed from market needs and 
are associated with bureaucratic practices which are not business-friendly. 
Few examples exist of government agencies acting as effective transferors 
of technology developed by their grantees. PROs are considered to be 
closer to the market and less bureaucratic. Further, by granting PROs the 
right to own technologies and intellectual property developed from 
government-funded research, they can be incentivised to protect and 
market such technologies and intellectual property, which is believed to 
increase the potential for successfully bringing products and processes to 
market based on such technology and intellectual property. 
1.3.3 Vis-a-vis licensees 
While PROs generally operate as independent organisations, at the same 
time they continue to have a public character, which requires them to be 
accountable to the taxpayer for the funding they receive from the public 
fiscus. It is argued that this accountability can best be achieved where the 
PRO retains ownership of intellectual property derived from publicly funded 
research, as this confers greater control over setting the conditions under 
which commercialisation is permitted and in monitoring compliance with 
such conditions. The PRO can therefore protect the public interest by 
means of license terms which require licensees to work the licensed 
technology diligently, failing which the license may be terminated. This 
avoids sterilisation of licensed technologies. The PRO is also able to 
ensure that its scientists continue to have access to licensed intellectual 
property for further research (Council On Governmental Relations, 1993; 
Council On Governmental Relations, 1999). 
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Industry, however, has its own fairly persuasive motivations for obtaining 
assignment of intellectual property. Unfettered ownership of intellectual 
property improves opportunities of leveraging such intellectual property for 
additional investment or cross-licensing, and grants companies greater 
autonomy and freedom in their business activities which utilise the relevant 
intellectual property. Some policies therefore provide room for a degree of 
flexibility in this regard, allowing PROs to assign their intellectual property 
in certain circumstances, which may be at their discretion, or limited to 
cases where stipulated conditions are met. 
While PRO ownership has come to be widely (although not unanimously) 
recognised as a best practice, it should be borne in mind that suitable 
contractual arrangements can be utilised to achieve similar ends in respect 
of most of the above motivations. In designing policy, due consideration 
ought to be given to the optimal arrangement, in view of the policy 
objectives, the status quo (including the costs of changing it), and the 
competing needs of the various stakeholders. 
1.4 TTOs and Technology Transfer Operating Models, Strategies 
and Performance 
The institutional technology transfer function is typically carried out by a 
TTO. The structure and specific roles of a TTO can differ quite 
considerably amongst organisations. For example, the technology transfer 
function may be carried out by a single central unit, or dispersed amongst 
faculties/units/departments, or a combination of central and devolved 
responsibilities. Even where there is not a dedicated unit, the function 
might be carried out by or in conjunction with one or more other existing 
offices, such as Sponsored Research, Development, Research Support, 
Contracts, Industry Liaison, etc. Some PROs set up a separate company 
or foundation from which their TTO operates, in order to be independent 
from the institution's administrative structures or to address liability issues. 
These are most commonly (although not exclusively) not-for-profit entities 
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fully-owned by the PRO concerned. TIO functions may also be 
outsourced to government agencies or private sector service providers, or 
shared between two or more organisations. In such cases, this would most 
likely be facilitated by a technology transfer liaison within the PRO. 
Reference to a 'TIO' in this dissertation incorporates all of these potential 
models (unless the specific context indicates otherwise). 
In addition to the specific intellectual property management role of a TTO 
described earlier, relating to the evaluation of invention disclosures, filing, 
prosecuting and maintaining patent applications and patents, and 
marketing and licensing of PRO technologies, most TIOs will also be 
responsible for a broader range of functions. These will differ from 
organisation to organisation, but might include advising on, negotiating, 
and or approving intellectual property terms of sponsored research and 
collaboration agreements; management of material transfer agreements 
(MTAs, used to record and monitor the transfer of material, especially 
biological materials, into and out of the organisation); providing an 
information and advisory resource on intellectual property matters to the 
PRO's stakeholders; and participating in the shaping of institutional 
research management strategy, including policy development. 
The direct intellectual property management function also includes regular 
reporting on intellectual property and technology transfer activity, both to 
internal and external bodies, tracking license agreements to confirm that 
licensees are fulfilling their obligations, and ensuring that income received 
by the PRO is allocated to the various beneficiaries in line with the 
institutional benefit-sharing formula. A new TTO is likely to devote 
substantial time to educating the research community about intellectual 
property matters and relevant institutional policies and procedures. The 
TIO must ensure that its commercial objectives do not interfere with the 
PRO's core missions of research, teaching and service/extension, avoid 
conflicts of interest and maintain ethical practices (Council On 
Governmental Relations, 1993). 
7 
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As central agents in the technology transfer process, nos have the 
potential to occupy a pivotal role in the National System of Innovation (NSI) 
as 'boundary spanners' between various components of the system, 
moving comfortably back and forth across these boundaries, 'translating' 
the needs and expectations of roleplayers on either side of an interface, 
finding common ground between them and articulating this on an ongoing 
basis. 
Many believe that the TTO can and should play an active role in structuring 
and mediating the relationships between various parties, both within the 
PRO and externally, seeking to achieve an outcome which is ideally both 
profitable and socially responsible. Consequently, a TTO becomes 
accountable (to greater or lesser degrees) to a range of customers and 
stakeholders. The US Council On Governmental Relations (1993) provides 
some examples of this: 
~ PRO management expects a TTO to bring in income for the 
organisation (preferably sufficient at least to cover the TTO's operating 
costs) and enhance the PRO's reputation (eg by contributing to regional 
economic development or demonstrating responsiveness to the needs 
of society). 
~ Researchers expect their TTO to assist in creating research funding 
opportunities for them, provide recognition, generate licensing income 
and ensure that their inventions and discoveries are usefully applied by 
society. 
~ Industry expects a TTO to provide access to new technologies and 
expertise at a cheap or reasonable price. 
~ Government expects a TTO to comply with relevant policies and 
advance government's social and economic objectives (eg create 
employment opportunities, contribute to regional economic 
development, transfer technologies which address local and national 
problems). 
It is of course no easy feat to meet all of these diverse expectations 
effectively. PROs therefore need to come up with technology transfer 
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strategies which are aligned with organisational missions and national 
objectives. Feldman et a/ (2002:106) observe: 
University technology transfer operations have multiple objectives as 
determinants of intellectual property strategy. Faculty retention, closer 
university-industry linkages, enhanced university prestige, and more 
generally enhanced and accelerated technology transfer for the social and 
economic benefit of the national or regional economy ... 
In prioritising objectives, technology transfer practitioners typically 
recognise three main TIO 'working models': income, service and economic 
development (Weeks, 2006). 
The income model involves focusing on those commercialisation 
opportunities which show the most potential for profitable exploitation, and 
actively seeking out licensees who demonstrate the best ability to generate 
high financial returns. TIO staff must therefore have sufficient 
technological and commercial expertise to 'pick winners' successfully. A 
relatively small number of invention disclosures meet the required criteria 
for technology transfer. Those with low or uncertain commercial potential 
(including technologies which might have social benefit applications) are 
unlikely to be exploited. 
Under a service model, the TTO emphasises service to researchers. All 
invention disclosures are treated equally (in theory), irrespective of their 
income-generating potential, which means that opportunities to maximise 
financial returns are likely to be reduced. A larger proportion of the 
research community will however benefit from the TIO's services, although 
the nature of the services might be less specialised, due to resource 
constraints. 
In terms of an economic development model, the main objective is to 
create new spin-out companies based on PRO technologies, preferably 
located close to the PRO concerned, to stimulate the regional economy by 
creating job opportunities and generating tax revenue. This requires 
complex skill sets and expertise, and typically a larger staff complement to 
Q 
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deal with the additional functions carried out. Often, PROs take equity in 
such companies in lieu of upfront license fees, which reduces short-term 
income generation potential, but the longer-term pay-off can be substantial 
if the company becomes successful. These enterprises are however high 
risk, and many do not succeed. Only a fraction of PRO technologies 
present suitable platforms for company formation. 
It is of relevance to emphasise that the choice of model will affect the 
magnitude of returns that a TTO is likely to generate, as well as the amount 
of time required to become profitable (well illustrated by Heher, 2005:217). 
In reality, most TTOs represent some mix of these models. It can be 
argued, though, that the strategic approach of a given PRO should involve 
some prioritisation of objectives, and be structured and staffed accordingly. 
Similarly, performance indicators should be appropriately matched to the 
main objectives. 
Effective communication to ensure that the full stakeholder base is aware 
of a TTO's goals and strategy is an important aspect of managing 
expectations, which as shown above, can differ considerably depending on 
the interests of the group concerned. For example, in considering the 
connotations associated with the terms 'commercial outreach' and 
'intellectual property' respectively appearing on university websites, Ozga 
and Jones (2006:13) note: 
The former [,commercial outreach'] suggests collaboration, partnership 
and linkage with external business interests, and thus - by implication -
some kind of symbiotic relationship between an HEI and a commercial 
organization, and a consequent blurring of boundaries between the public 
and private sectors. The latter term ['intellectual property'] pulls in quite a 
different direction, however. Here, the idea of 'intellectual property' implies 
that knowledge, expertise and information are owned by the university -
and that the university controls the content and right to exploit this 
knowledge. The inference is therefore one of safeguarding the knowledge 
products of the public sector, rather than seeking to push them out into the 
private sector. 
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While some PROs have had notable 'big-hit' technology transfer successes 
which have produced substantial revenues, these are few and far between. 
Nonetheless, they continue to attract a great deal of attention, and in some 
cases have served to create unrealistic expectations of the kinds of returns 
that are likely to be achieved. Geiger describes this as an attempt by 
universities to 'rationalize serendipity by analyzing the etiology of these 
mega-winners' (2006:426). For the most part, though, it is now widely 
accepted that the net income-generating potential of PRO technology 
transfer activities for most PROs is modest, especially when the not 
insubstantial costs of running a TTO are factored in (Crown Copyright, 
2003). The Canadian Expert Panel Report (ACST, 1999:2) states that 
'discoveries that produce financial bonanzas are so rare that policies 
designed to pursue them would almost always lead to failure.' Crowell 
(2006:5), citing a study by Boston University's Office of Technology 
Development, provides the following figures: 
;- The median yearly income of US nos is estimated at below 
US$500,000. 
;- Fewer than half of TTOs which are less than 15 years old generate a 
positive net return for their institution. 
, Less than a third of universities whose annual research expenditure is 
less than US$100 million have a profitable technology transfer 
operation. 
Heher (2005) notes that, on the basis of research and innovation value 
chain data from the USA, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), 
nos with trained and competent staff in operation for at least eight years 
may hope to generate license income amounting to 1-2% of their 
institution's R&D expenditure, but cautions that this is by no means 
guaranteed for a particular PRO, because of the variability and skewness 
which characterise returns at the level of the individual organisation (Sherer 
and Harhoff, 2000). Boettiger and Bennett (2006) observe that, with 
experience, most US TTOs now see the benefits of local economic 
development, improved university-industry relationships and start-up 
company formation as of higher priority than maximising the revenue they 
11 
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may generate for their organisations. This would seem to be borne out by 
the statement in the recent Association of University Technology Managers 
(AUTM) Survey Summary (AUTM, 2007a:13) that: 
Most institutions would define success through the criterion of public 
benefit. Offices that return the charitable support from government and 
private resources to the public in the form of products and services that 
benefit the local community are held in high regard by those communities 
and their technology transfer colleagues. 
1.5 Measuring Technology Transfer Performance: Activity and 
Impact 
The discussion above therefore raises the complex question of how 
technology transfer performance can best be measured. The value and 
relevance of different indicators are somewhat subjective, and the 
respective interests and expectations of different stakeholders will inform 
which criteria are for them are of greater or lesser importance. Bozeman 
(2000:628) pOints out that: 
... technology transfer effectiveness can have several meanings, including 
market impacts, political impacts, impacts on personnel involved and 
impacts on resources available for other purposes and other scientific and 
technical objectives. 
The metrics which have been employed are generally a mix of quantitative 
input (ie activity-related) and output (ie impact-related) factors representing 
different stages of the technology transfer process, as well as more 
qualitative or intangible factors (often more difficult to measure, yet highly 
relevant). Commentators have also warned of the danger of measurable 
proxies becoming a substitute for the true policy goals and thus wielding 
undue influence as policy drivers, which ultimately sees the overall goals 
diminish in visibility and importance (Langford et ai, 2006). While the 
selection of appropriate metrics and indicators continues to generate much 
discussion, the following lists from the US Council On Governmental 
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Relations (1993) contain some of those which are commonly used and 
recognised. 
Metrics related to TTO activity include: 
.,. Number of invention disclosures 
,. Number of patent applications filed 
.,. Number of patents granted 
.,. Number of license agreements signed 
.,. Amount of license income generated 
, Number of licensed products sold 
.,. Number of research agreements signed (amount of research income 
generated) 
, Number of spin-out companies formed. 
Metrics related to the indirect impact of PRO technology transfer include: 
.,. Retention of research staff 
.,. Attraction of students (especially at graduate level) 
.,. Institutional reputation for innovation 
" Enhancement of research endeavour overall 
.,. Marketplace impact of PRO-derived technologies. 
The most longstanding instrument for measuring technology transfer 
activity is the AUTM licensing survey, which has been produced annually 
since 1991, collating data supplied by US and Canadian TTO 
respondents.2 The structure of the survey has evolved over time, and 
continues to do so, but nonetheless provides what is generally considered 
to be a useful source of longitudinal data. In its current format, it 'captures 
the activities that an office engages in rather than the impact or results of 
licenses' (AUTM, 2007a:8) and as such primarily serves to provide 
benchmark data of TTO resources and activities. In the past, the AUTM 
survey supplied estimates of the financial contribution to the economy, jobs 
supported and tax revenue generated from academic licensing activity. 
2 Other countries and regions, including the UK, Australia and Europe, have developed 
survey instruments. 
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However, this was subsequently discontinued after the figures were 
disputed (Heher, 2005). The survey now contains vignettes briefly 
describing selected 'success stories' of technology transfer which has 
benefited society. In addition, in 2005 AUTM launched its Better World 
Project 'to promote public understanding of how academic research and 
technology transfer have changed our way of life and made the world a 
better place' (AUTM, 2007b:2). Better World Reports are periodically 
compiled, relating stories of companies and innovations based on 
academic research. 
Irrespective of model or strategy adopted, in order to carry out their 
function successfully, it is widely held that nos must be located in an 
enabling environment, and have access to adequate and appropriate forms 
of support (Heher, 2005). At the institutional level, this requires appropriate 
support from researchers, management and governing structures. This 
must be underpinned by a comprehensive suite of well-aligned, coherent 
and consistently applied institutional policies and procedures dealing with 
intellectual property management and technology transfer, conflict of 
interest, private work, ethics and research management. Similarly, it is 
argued that key elements for a successful PRO technology transfer 
enterprise include motivating incentives (including benefit-sharing), funding, 
multi-skilled staff, commitment from senior management and appropriate 
evaluation and benchmarking to facilitate learning (Milken Institute, 2006). 
This dissertation asserts that at national level, a wide range of policy and 
regulatory measures affects the prospects for successful technology 
transfer. This includes interventions directly targeted at innovation and 
technology transfer, as well as others that shape the broader environment. 
In reality, to differing degrees in different national systems (and even within 
different institutions in a single system), several factors usually exist which 
hinder optimal operation, and relevant policies, even when well-intentioned, 
do not always achieve their objectives. In essence, the past three decades 
or so of technology transfer experience internationally (especially in the 
USA, as discussed in more detail in section 4.2) have taught that this is a 
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complex, cross-cutting, multidimensional, long-term activity. In most 
places, this is a fairly new institutional function and fledgling 'profession'. 
While certain practices have become somewhat standardised, it is 
generally recognised that different contexts call for alternative approaches, 
as a consequence of which no single set of 'best practices' exists. The 
needs of different stakeholders do not always coincide, which results in the 
expectations of at least some being disappointed. TIOs are often under-
resourced, whether in terms of skills and capacity, or financial support, or 
both. Efforts continue to construct appropriate metrics for accurately and 
effectively tracking PRO technology transfer performance and impact. 
Technology transfer is therefore the subject of ongoing debates on topics 
ranging from whether it ought to be done at all, to how it ought to be done 
and what it ought to achieve. 
In the chapters which follow, this dissertation will examine these issues and 
assess their relevance in the contemporary South African context, where 
policymakers are grappling with an appropriate policy design. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
RATIONALE, OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Academic study of university technology transfer is of growing interest. 
The topic extends into and across a variety of academic disciplines and 
fields of endeavour, and can therefore be tackled from numerous different 
angles. Scholars from a wide range of disciplines (including economics, 
management strategy, business, law, science studies, political science, 
history, sociology and education) have approached the topic from diverse 
perspectives, using a variety of methodological and analytical techniques. 3 
Technology transfer practitioners, reflecting on the impact of their work, 
have also contributed to the discourse. A large proportion of the existing 
research is based on data from the USA, as the place with the longest 
tradition of university technology transfer practice. Good information on 
university-industry relationships more generally in Europe is also available, 
and data from other countries and regions is increasingly being gathered 
and analysed (Mowery and Shane, 2002). But overall, although increasing, 
the body of knowledge remains somewhat limited, and the differing 
approaches have produced material which is at times disjointed and does 
not always easily lend itself to comparative study. As Bozeman comments 
in his wide-ranging review article on technology transfer and public policy 
(2000:627): 'In the study of technology transfer, the neophyte and the 
veteran researcher are easily distinguished. The neophyte is the one who 
is not confused'. 
When developing countries are considered, including South Africa, 
information is especially scarce. One reason for this is that, apart from a 
handful of exceptions, university technology transfer activity has only 
recently been taken up, if at all. But as developing countries, especially 
those with acknowledged innovative capacity, seek ways to harness 
innovation effectively for development, attention has been directed at how 
3 This is illustrated to some extent by a scan of the Bibliography for this dissertation, which 
shows the vast array of journals and other publications cited, spanning several of these 
disciplines. 
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to increase the returns from the public investment in R&D by ensuring that 
laboratory research is translated into useful products, processes and 
services capable of enhancing quality of life, creating jobs and wealth and 
improving international competitiveness. This is true of South Africa today, 
where targeted policy interventions in this area are under development 
(see Chapter 5). However, difficulties in applying the existing data for 
developed countries to the local environment, coupled with the dearth of 
developing country-specific data, arguably stand in the way of effective 
policymaking. 
One objective of this dissertation is therefore to attempt to begin to fill in the 
gaps, by collating and discussing some of the key literature and examining 
policy approaches and practical experiences of other countries, with a view 
to extracting policy lessons which can be tested against the South African 
situation. This is done with specific reference to the South African 
Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research Framework 
(the IPR Framework) (Department of Science and Technology, 2005/6), 
and the recent Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed 
Research Bill: Draft (the Draft Bill)4 based upon it. 
Since the Framework document bibliography lists few peer-reviewed 
papers and other scholarly sources, and almost no South African data 
whatsoever,s the literature which is discussed and/or cited throughout the 
dissertation provides an alternative body of information which can be used 
as a basis for evaluating policy proposals and stimulating further discussion 
on appropriate policy by South African stakeholders. It is well-known by 
those familiar with the field that the costs and benefits of technology 
transfer are the subject of extensive and ongoing debate. However, as will 
4 Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research Bill: Draft (Gazette 29950, 
Notice 719), 8 June 2007, available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/bills/draft2007.htm (accessed 3 February 2008). 
5 It is acknowledged that there is not a lot of relevant South African data, but it is by no 
means as rare as the two non-substantive references to South African material listed in 
the bibliography would seem to indicate. (These are for one government website and one 
law firm website respectively, both of which contain fairly routine information rather than 
substantive content.) 
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be argued in Chapter 6, the Framework document fails to deliberate on 
most of the major concerns. It is submitted that stakeholder discussion on 
the promise and the risks of the endeavour is required, and that explicit 
responses to these issues are an essential element of any comprehensive 
policy process on technology transfer - all the more so for South Africa, 
since many of the issues have particular relevance for development. This 
omission is addressed at least partially by the relevant material in the 
dissertation. Chapter 3 discusses the benefits of a technology transfer 
system functioning optimally, and raises some of the controversies and 
caveats associated with PRO technology transfer. 
Chapter 4 provides some examples of technology transfer policy 
approaches adopted by other countries. No discussion of this topic would 
be complete without examining the US 8ayh-Dole Act, deemed to be the 
key catalyst in spurring technology transfer activities in US universities. A 
handful of other countries were also selected for discussion. These include 
Canada (as an example of a country with an established technology 
transfer system that is not regulated by legislation), Denmark (representing 
a country which introduced legislation in order to shift ownership of 
intellectual property from academics to PROs), France (exemplifying the 
use of legislation aimed at strengthening PRO-industry linkages and 
stimulating the development of spin-out companies based on PRO 
technologies) and Italy (where legislation served to transfer ownership from 
employing institutions to individual researchers, counter to the predominant 
trends elsewhere). 
Some of the key Canadian documents are examined in some detail. The 
policy initiatives and reviews which have taken place in Canada over the 
years have generated an enormous amount of reports and background 
documentation.6 Although similar debates have taken place in the USA, 
they have not been captured in policy documents in the same way as they 
have been in Canada. It was therefore deemed useful to take a deeper 
6 Riddle (2004) catalogues a large amount of relevant documentation. 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
THE EVOL VING POLICY LANDSCAPE FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM PRO'S IN SOUTH AFRICA 
look at selected documents. Less English language literature is available 
for the European countries discussed. Furthermore, most of the relevant 
policy developments have been fairly recent. As a result, the policy 
analysis presented in relation to these countries is necessarily less 
detailed. 
While it would have been desirable to include developing countries in this 
chapter, the paucity of available data would have rendered any discussion 
fairly superficial. As a result, a decision was taken to focus on the selected 
developed countries, which lent themselves to a richer discussion. 
It should be clarified that this section does not constitute a comprehensive 
review of international policies. Nor are the featured countries intended to 
be representative of best practice. This sample is nonetheless useful to 
illustrate a variety of different policy objectives and approaches, 
necessitated by different circumstances prevailing at the time of the 
relevant developments in the countries concerned. The focus is on policy 
changes and their impact, rather than on the legal minutiae of the 
respective policy and legislative instruments of each country. 
The relevant South African policy environment pertaining to the IPR 
Framework and Draft Bill is then discussed in Chapter 5, in order to provide 
sufficient context for the policy critique which follows in Chapter 6. A brief 
overview of technology transfer in South African PROs is given, based 
mainly on personal observation of and participation in the system, before 
looking at the policy history leading up to the release of the IPR 
Framework, and the subsequent Draft Bill. The key provisions of these 
documents are summarised. Other selected policy and regulatory 
developments which impact on technology transfer, or have the potential to 
do so, are also mentioned. This is done with relative brevity, and does not 
claim to cover all potentially relevant South African policies and 
developments comprehensively, due to space constraints and a decision to 
focus here in greater depth on the specific policy under consideration, 
namely the policy on intellectual property rights from publicly financed 
.,0 
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research. Further, while it is explicitly acknowledged that the broader 
innovation policy environment will of course impact directly on the success 
or failure of any technology transfer interventions, it is noted that this has 
been examined in detail elsewhere, (notably in the 2007 DECO review of 
South Africa's innovation policy (DECO, 2007), as well as in Kraak (2007)). 
Nonetheless, it is suggested that by highlighting a handful of other relevant 
policy issues which may lead to misalignments with the IPR Framework, 
the importance of a holistic approach by policymakers can be emphasised. 
The critique of the IPR Framework and Draft Bill in the concluding chapter 
(Chapter 6) deals generally with the motivation for following a legislative 
route as opposed to employing other policy instruments, and specifically 
with particular provisions that are proposed. The analysis draws on the 
literature and on the approaches of other systems, as well as on personal 
experience as a technology transfer practitioner in a South African 
university and science council, which has provided a personal view of, and 
hands-on exposure to, the South African technology transfer system, and 
afforded opportunities to interact with local, African and other international 
practitioners, academics and policymakers in the field, via conferences, 
workshops, professional organisations and other fora). Where 
observations made in this dissertation are informed by personal 
experience, this may be likened to assuming the role of an anthropological 
'participant-observer' (while acknowledging that this is carried out in a less 
systematic and rigorous manner than anthropological research 
methodology would more typically demand). 
The Draft Bill is examined with a view to determining the policy implications 
of its provisions, using the IPR Framework as a reference to assist in 
ascertaining the intentions of the drafters. As such, this assessment does 
not constitute a detailed legal analysis. It is noted that the Draft Bill 
contains what appear to be a number of drafting inconsistencies or errors, 
but it is not deemed necessary to point these out in the critique, on the 
assumption that they will be corrected in subsequent drafts. 
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The penultimate section of Chapter 6 draws together the general 
discussion on technology transfer, the comparative review of policy 
approaches adopted by different countries, and the prevailing conditions 
which characterise the South African environment, in order to develop a set 
of tentative policy recommendations. These are designed, from the 
perspective of both an academic and a practitioner, to offer some realistic 
and practical alternatives and enhancements to the current framework, 
better informed by evidence and thus more firmly grounded. It is 
suggested that these proposals might be applied more broadly than in this 
dissertation alone. In addition to providing insights to guide and inform 
policymakers, they might also serve to enrich the public debate and assist 
in increasing legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders, ultimately improving 
the prospects for a successful policy intervention. 
It is acknowledged that at the time of writing, the relevant South African 
policy landscape is in flux, with the draft legislation under review (and the 
expectation that substantial redrafting is underway).? As such, writing the 
dissertation is to some extent an exercise taking place in 'real-time'. On 
the one hand, this makes the subject matter especially timely and topical, 
but it also means that the relevance of this section may be superceded to 
some extent as further policy developments unfold. Nonetheless, it is 
argued that the contextual material can provide useful background for 
researchers undertaking empirical studies on technology transfer, and that 
the tentative recommendations made here should carry some value for 
policymakers and other South African stakeholders irrespective of the 
timing and final form of the legislation (or alternative policy interventions), 
whether as input into the current policymaking process, to assess the 
appropriateness and success of promulgated legislation or to lobby for 
change. Many of the issues raised will also potentially be of interest to 
international scholars studying technology transfer and seeking 
comparative perspectives, as well as to policymakers, especially those 
from other developing countries, bearing in mind the scarcity of information 
7 This expectation is based on informal communication from government officials. 
,., .. 
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available on developing country technology transfer policy and practice. As 
such, it is hoped that this will also be a useful contribution to the growing 
body of literature on PRO technology transfer, advancing the field by 
viewing the data and experiences emanating overwhelmingly from the 
developed world through a developing country lens. 
Source materials consulted in the course of writing this dissertation include 
peer-reviewed books and journal papers (from both the natural and social 
sciences), commissioned reports, South African and international 
government documents (including policies, strategies and legislation), 
instructional and informational materials, and articles from the mainstream 
and specialist press. 
Because the South African policy covers both universities and other public 
research organisations, the dissertation encompasses both types of 
institution, collectively referred to as 'public research organisations' or 
'PROs". However, it is expressly noted that much of the literature deals 
specifically with universities, and some of the key issues which arise are of 
particular pertinence to universities and their role in an innovation system. 
The dissertation therefore distinguishes universities from other PROs, 
where the source material does so and where the context demands this. 
The dissertation aims to bring new insights to bear on the material 
presented and in so doing, advance the stakeholder discourse. It 
contributes to fulfilling the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) recommendation that innovation policy be subjected 
to a 'rigorous but comprehensive rationale' (OECD, 2007: 18). It is 
interdisciplinary, interpretive and integrative, trends characteristic of what 
Boyer describes as the 'scholarship of integration', which operates 'at the 
boundaries where fields converge' (1990:19) and involves 'making 
connections across disciplines, placing the specialties in larger contest, 
illuminating data in a revealing way, often educating nonspecialists, too' 
(1990:18). 
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CHAPTER 3: 
WHY ARE WE INTERESTED IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER? 
3.1 Why is Technology Transfer (Potentially) Important? 
Interest in the role of PROs as producers of R&D for innovation in a NSI, in 
the past overshadowed by emphasis on the role of firms, is now growing 
(Godin and Gingras, 2000). In the context of economic growth in the global 
knowledge-based economy, many argue that PROs can - and indeed 
should - make a valuable contribution to the NSI and to their local and 
national economies through their research endeavours, even as they 
debate the nature of such contribution (Etzkowitz et ai, 2000; Etzkowitz, 
2004; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; Mowery and Sampat, 2005; Nelson, 
2001; Rosenberg and Nelson, 1993). 
At the same time, it is also recognised that the research performed by 
PROs does not always have as much of an impact on the economy as it 
might, because it is not sufficiently relevant or accessible to companies or 
communities who might benefit from the results of such research. While 
the relevance issue will generally depend on a combination of funding 
sources and institutional research management strategy, the technology 
transfer function is designed to enhance accessibility, by ensuring that 
research results which are capable of being usefully applied are more 
appropriately protected, packaged, marketed and transferred to agents 
outside the PRO who are interested and able to exploit them, whether 
commercially or for social impact. 
By working on solutions to address local problems and by developing 
innovative new products, PROs can be a source of new technology for 
companies and potentially assist in enhancing health, quality of life and 
competitiveness. The formation of new companies and the development of 
new product lines facilitated by technology transfer aids job creation and 
generates increased tax revenue. Moreover, as recipients of public funds 
.... 
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which support their research, PROs need to show a return on investment to 
taxpayers and demonstrate their relevance and responsiveness to the 
community, in order to justify continued support from government. 
Successful technology transfer programmes can be a means for doing so. 
A further motivation for PRO technology transfer is the opportunity for 
PROs to share in the profits of commercialisation partners who take the 
PRO technologies to market. These can then be ploughed back into PRO 
research activities and shared with innovative researchers as part of 
broader incentive and reward schemes. 
Thus, a well-functioning technology transfer system can catalyse a virtuous 
cycle wherein a sustainable research base is well-supported over time, and 
continues to produce outputs which are useful and relevant in the wider 
economy. This 'best-case scenario' is captured by Remington (2005:17), 
who comments that: 'Universities' inventions yield products and processes 
that save lives, diagnose diseases, reduce pain and suffering, improve 
health, make people see and smile. The net result is patient cures, jobs, a 
vibrant economy, and continuing innovations.' 
3.2 Why is Technology Transfer (Sometimes) Controversial? 
Unfortunately, the 'ideal' outcome represented by the virtuous cycle 
described above is neither immediate nor assured, and it is by no means 
universally accepted that the technology transfer function is necessary or 
even beneficial for many PROs, particularly universities. Some of the 
arguments raised by detractors in this regard are therefore now discussed. 
3.2.1 Skewed research agenda 
One objection stems from the concern that the imperative to perform 
technology transfer skews the research agenda by encouraging 
researchers to focus unduly on commercial opportunities, especially those 
which offer a financial incentive, at the expense of fundamental research 
and academic integrity. However, there is little clear evidence to support 
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this assertion (Nelson, 2001; Mowery et aI, 2001), with studies showing 
that the proportion of research which can be classified as basic research is 
not decreasing (Thursby and Thursby, 2003), that the motivation for 
undertaking research projects which produced commercialisable results 
was not primarily financial (Colyvas et aI, 2002), and that the potential for 
patenting does not influence the choice of research project (Agrawal and 
Henderson, 2002). Sources and terms of research funding playa stronger 
role in influencing the types of research project undertaken. The rise of 
support for biomedical research, which often fits into the category of 'use-
inspired basic research', 8 has been mentioned as one contributing factor 
which has led to increased patenting opportunities for upstream research 
results derived from fundamental research which tackles practical 
problems, and may therefore yield commercially valuable outcomes 
(Colyvas, 2007; Mowery et aI, 2004) (see also section 3.2.6). Sobolski et 
al (2005) however introduce a caveat, noting that due to the plentiful 
availability of funding for basic research in the USA, researchers do not 
need to prioritise income-generating projects in order to support their 
research activities. In other countries, that might not be the case. This 
merits further investigation, bearing in mind that the sources cited here all 
examine data from the USA. 
3.2.2 Conflicts of interest 
There are also fears that conflicts of commitment and conflicts of interest 
might arise (Blumenthal, 2003; Crespo and Dridi, 2007; Daza-Cambell and 
Slaughter, 1999; Erlich and Gutterman, 2003; Kneller, 2001; Nelson, 2001; 
Press and Washburn, 2000), as PRO employees focus on commercial 
opportunities at the expense of their teaching and research obligations, 
behave unethically in respect of financial interests (eg by failing to disclose 
pertinent information), or bias results (perhaps unwittingly) in favour of a 
commercial partner. These are acknowledged risks, which must be 
managed and monitored actively and continuously, highlighting the 
8 This description is used by Stokes in Pasteur's Quadrant (2007). 
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importance of appropriate, well-enforced policies on conflict of interest, as 
well as private work, consulting and ethics (Etzkowitz, 2006). 
3.2.3 Institutional divisions 
Another concern is that technology transfer may function as a divisive force 
within institutions. Opportunities for technology transfer are more common 
in some areas of research than others, which means that certain 
departments and researchers are likely to benefit more than others, 
creating disparities amongst individuals and departments in the same 
organisation and generating resentment. Slaughter and Leslie (1997: 141) 
describe the emergence of 'a new hierarchy of prestige and privilege' in 
universities, with those professors in fields close to the market being best 
positioned to benefit. Researchers in disciplines which offer few 
opportunities for technology transfer might feel that it is inequitable that 
their peers in other fields earn additional income through an institutional 
formula for sharing licensing income. Conversely, 'inventing' researchers 
and departments are often not happy that the institutional share of licensing 
income might be distributed at least partially in support of 'non-inventing' 
researchers or departments. The humanities might be even further 
marginalised, if research funding is redirected towards projects which show 
greater potential for commercialisation. 
Establishment of an institutional benefit-sharing formula goes some way 
towards addressing this problem, if crafted so as to achieve an appropriate 
balance of rewards, taking into account the circumstances of the institution 
concerned, and the impact of the PRO's technology transfer policy on 
different institutional constituencies. 
3.2.4 Limitations on academic freedom 
Prioritisation of commercial criteria might also compromise academic 
freedom, for example by requiring publication restrictions or delays, where 
premature publication or disclosure of certain data might jeopardise the 
chances of patenting or commercialisation. While a survey of four 
countries (USA, Japan, Germany and the UK) commissioned by the 
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American Association for the Advancement of Science found that the need 
to protect scientific work may in certain instances lead researchers to delay 
publication, to publish incompletely or not to publish at all (Directorate for 
Science and Policy Programs, 2007), data from several studies suggests 
that patenting and entrepreneurial behaviour on the part of researchers on 
the whole does not detract from their overall research output, and very 
often 'serial patenters' will also be highly published and/or cited. For 
example, Agrawal and Henderson (2002) found that for the vast majority of 
researchers in their study, publications remain far more important than 
patents, and that for those researchers who were patenting, this was more 
likely to be as a complementary activity to basic research rather than as a 
substitute. Furthermore, on the basis of a positive correlation between 
patent counts and citations of publications, they tentatively concluded that 
patent counts may serve as an indicator of research impact. Lowe and 
Gonzalez-Brambila (2007) showed that faculty entrepreneurs in their study 
were generally more productive researchers than peers who were not 
involved in starting up new companies, based on average number of 
publications and publication citations, and moreover, that the publication 
activity of such faculty entrepreneurs typically does not decrease even after 
setting up a firm. Stephan et a/ (2007) noted a positive correlation between 
numbers of patents and publications, while at the same time failing to find 
any evidence of a trade-off between commercialisation and publication. In 
addition, the Milken Institute (2006) has observed a correlation between 
institution-wide research activity (measured by publications) and licensing 
income in an international study investigating technology transfer in the 
field of biotechnology. 
Here too, institutional policy, including that governing the types of 
contractual terms a PRO might agree to, can playa role in regulating the 
conditions under which information is placed in or kept out of the public 
domain. Depending on a particular institution's mandate and research 
culture, poliCies could grant individual researchers greater or lesser 
autonomy in respect of publication decisions. So, for example, it might be 
expected that universities allow their researchers greater latitude in making 
...... 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
ROSEMARY A WOLSON MPHIL 
decisions on publications than other PROs. In this vein, it is of interest to 
note that a Canadian Expert Panel, in the context of making 
recommendations for national policy (see section 4.3), explicitly 
recommended that university researchers retain the option to choose to put 
their research results into the public domain rather than to pursue 
commercialisation (ACST, 1999). 
3.2.5 Value added by TTOs does not justify their expense 
Another criticism of TTOs at PROs is the expense of operating them, and 
the transaction costs they are sometimes perceived to add. While some 
hold the impression that TTOs present a good opportunity for income 
generation, experience shows that this is generally the exception rather 
than the rule (as discussed in section 1.4) (ACST, 1999; Crown Copyright, 
2003). Substantial investment is required to staff them adequately with 
individuals having the requisite mix of formal qualifications, skills and 
experience as well as to cover legal, patent and marketing costs. Even 
TTOs with successful licensing programmes tend to take several years 
before they are able to break even by generating sufficient licensing 
income to cover their own operating costs, and some apparently fail to do 
so at all (Crowell, 2006; Heher, 2005). As such, a TTO is generally an 
institutional cost centre rather than a profit centre (Geiger, 2006), which 
leads some to question whether the institutional investment in technology 
transfer activities might not be better redirected to support research 
directly. 
Notwithstanding the TTO's 'boundary spanning' potential mentioned earlier, 
stakeholder perceptions of the value that a TTO contributes to the 
technology transfer process can be negative, and the oversight role that 
the TTO plays is not always welcomed. TTOs are often unappreciated by 
some of their customers, with certain PRO researchers and/or their 
industry licensees believing that they are better equipped to negotiate 
directly with each other, viewing the TTO (as well as the policies and 
processes they are obliged to follow and enforce) as obstructive to 
concluding a transaction (Valentin and Jensen, 2007). The extent of the 
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problem in a particular PRO will depend inter alia on the capacity of the 
no to offer specialised expertise and to respond timeously, the degree of 
bureaucracy inherent in the PRO's administration more generally, and the 
level of trust between the TTO and the research community (which in turn 
will depend upon there being in place enough of a shared vision of the 
technology transfer enterprise). Some industry research sponsors believe 
that stronger emphasis on ownership of intellectual property rights by 
universities presents a barrier to collaboration (Lorentzen, 2007). Where 
commercial licenses are involved, arguably the time taken to negotiate a 
good contract which accurately represents the understanding between the 
parties is worthwhile and is likely to reduce the possibility of legal disputes 
occurring down the line. The degree to which such negotiations are likely 
to be productive will depend on the competency to conduct the negotiations 
of both parties as well as on the points at issue between them. In the 
absence of a TTO, companies would generally have to negotiate directly 
with PRO researchers. Particularly where multiple researchers are 
involved, this is unlikely to reduce the transaction costs of accessing the 
desired technology. 
3.2.6 Scientific advances impeded by the increase in proprietisation of 
research results 
A concern which has received considerable attention is the potential impact 
of technology transfer activity on restricting possible research opportunities 
or choices, arising from the increase in patenting of PRO research results 
which typically occurs with the establishment of a no. This has the effect 
of making proprietary, and thus less accessible, information and materials 
which might otherwise have been available in the public domain. Where 
early stage research results and research tools become the subject of 
patents (which is particularly the case for biotechnology and biomedical 
research, as pointed out in section 3.2.1 above), the risk of restricting 
downstream research by others becomes an issue. Descriptive 
terminology has been employed to highlight the potential dangers. Heller 
and Eisenberg (1998) warn of the possibility of a 'tragedy of the 
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anticommons' ,9 while the concept of a 'patent thicket' is similarly evocative, 
describing 'a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a 
company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new 
technology' (Shapiro, 2001:1). 
Heller and Eisenberg's theory (1998) suggests that the creation of an 
anticommons would hold back the progress of scientific research, by 
forcing researchers to navigate a fragmented landscape in order to gain 
access to a variety of upstream intellectual property rights held by multiple 
parties and required as inputs for future research. This would multiply 
transaction costs, as negotiations must take place with each patent holder. 
Moreover, because the potential pool of patent holders as well as users 
consists of various public and private organisations with differing objectives 
and agendas, negotiations with different parties would be likely to require 
different approaches and access agreements would be likely to be subject 
to different kinds of terms. At least some rights holders might be expected 
to over-estimate the value of their technologies, which would exacerbate 
the situation. Cumulatively, these factors seem to indicate a strong 
possibility for negotiations to break down at one or another stage, which 
would delay or even completely block off certain research avenues. A 
possible consequence of this in the field of biomedical research might be 
lost opportunities for the development of life-saving drugs. Debate 
continues about the validity of these concerns. 
Related to this is the role of MTAs, as a common instrument to govern the 
transfer of biological materials (which mayor may not be patented) for use 
as research tools or reagents: do they raise transaction costs by requiring 
complex negotiations, or do they facilitate the exchange of material by 
providing a clear legal framework which protects the interests of both 
parties (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2007)? MTA terms may vary considerably, 
from allowing the recipient organisation a high degree of freedom in how it 
9 This alludes to the concept of the 'tragedy of the commons', which refers to the overuse 
of public resources. The 'tragedy of the anticommons' is the obverse of this, referring to 
the under-use of fragmented, privately-held resources. 
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uses the material concerned and full ownership of any intellectual property 
developed through use of the material, to restricting use narrowly and 
building in 'reach-through' rights which grant the owner of the material 
certain rights in intellectual property created by the recipient (ranging from 
full or joint ownership, to exclusive license rights, or a non-exclusive 
license). 
Streitz and Bennett (2003) document some of the contentious terms 
university researchers must negotiate when attempting to access materials 
under an MTA (especially where companies are the material providers). 
These include securing the right to disseminate research results, the right 
to own research results developed with use of the covered materials, the 
possibility of taking on conflicting legal obligations in respect of the provider 
and other parties (eg a research funder), restrictions on the university's 
ability to carry out its public interest mission, and the option of receiving fair 
consideration in the event that the company uses the university's research 
results commercially. Although observing that 'overall, the transfer of 
materials between researchers has been getting more difficult' (2003: 13), 
and that on the basis of their experience, they find that companies often 
assign a low priority to material transfers to PROs, as they do not stand to 
gain much from them, they also note that in most cases, solutions which 
meet the needs of both parties are possible. 
In an effort to address some of these concerns, the US National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) has issued Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH 
Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating 
Biomedical Research Resources (Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1999), intended to promote the widespread availability of 
research tools developed on NIH funding, while at the same time 
recognising the need for limited restrictions as an incentive for commercial 
development. The principles call for academic freedom and publication to 
be ensured, appropriate implementation of Bayh-Dole (see section 4.2) to 
be facilitated, administrative impediments to academic research to be 
minimised, and dissemination of research resources developed with NIH 
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funds to be assured, and are supplemented with implementation 
guidelines. 
For the most part, those who have investigated the anticommons concern 
(eg Buckley, 2007; Directorate for Science and Policy Programs, 2007; 
Mowery et aI, 2001; Seide and Macleod, 1998; Walsh et aI, 2003; Walsh 
et aI, 2005; Walsh et ai, 2007) have found only limited (although not 
negligible) evidence of research projects which have had to be redirected 
or which have not gone ahead for this reason. Delays to research were 
encountered on occasion, but were for the most part neither sufficiently 
frequent nor lengthy to present an insurmountable barrier to conducting the 
research concerned. 
One case study, recounting attempts to develop a database collating 
genetic information held by multiple scientists around the world, describes 
the development of an anticommons (Maurer, 2006). However, while this 
account is instructive as an illustration of some of the anticommons 
conditions at work, it must be noted that patented technologies were not 
involved, and various other factors also contributed to the failure of the 
initiative. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a biotechnology industry study asserts 
that the existence of an anticommons cannot be supported (Buckley, 
2007). This paper posits that if a 'tragedy of the anticommons' was indeed 
occurring, we would be seeing a decline in R&D, fewer potential innovative 
drug therapies being tested and industry stakeholders calling for a public 
policy remedy. On the contrary, however, data (albeit it somewhat limited 
in scope) is provided to demonstrate R&D and venture capital investment 
growth in biotechnology companies, as well as an increase in the numbers 
respectively of original Investigational New Drug submissions and of 
biological compounds entering preclinical trials. On the basis of the 
position of the industry stakeholder organisation for whom the study was 
carried out, it is further averred that biotechnology companies are satisfied 
that the patent system is supporting rather than hindering innovation. 
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In a direct response to Heller and Eisenberg (1998), Seide and Macleod 
(1998) state their belief that the degree of fragmentation of which Heller 
and Eisenberg warn has been overstated, with the potential numbers of 
intellectual property owners and blocking patents respectively being lower 
than Heller and Eisenberg assume. They further note that in practice, 
institutional researchers on average pay little attention to the patent status 
of materials they are using for non-commercial research (in effect, 
assuming that they may use these under a research exemption) and 
moreover, successful precedents exist for negotiating necessary licenses 
in the field of biotechnology. 
Walsh et afs 2003 study appears to lend support to these views. Interview 
respondents from industry reported that, although a large number of 
patents relevant to particular work were often initially identified, only a small 
subset of these would generally claim subject matter for which a license 
would be required. They also found that both firms and PROs adopted 
various 'working solutions' to facilitate their research, including use of 
research exemptions, entering into license agreements, inventing around 
patented technology, use of public research tools and challenging patent 
validity by means of litigation. As a result, they concluded that intellectual 
property protection of research inputs was not unduly restricting biomedical 
research. 
More recent studies (Walsh et aI, 2005; Walsh et aI, 2007) yielded data 
indicating that as a rule, patents do not pose a significant barrier to the 
acquisition by biomedical scientists to the knowledge inputs they require for 
their research. One reason for this is that academic researchers were 
found to have little awareness of relevant third party patents in their field, 
even subsequent to the 2002 US Madey v Duke court decision (which held 
that no general research exemption against infringement applied in respect 
of university researchers).1o These studies did however observe 
10 Madey v Duke University, 307 F3d 1351 (Fed Cir 2002). 
.. .. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ROSEMARY A WOLSON MPHIL 
impediments faced by researchers when they attempt to access tangible 
research materials from other parties. Refusals to requests for material 
were experienced by a significant minority of respondents in the sample 
under study, and such refusals appeared to be on the increase. The 
reasons for refusals were attributed more to factors such as scientific 
competition, commercial interests and the time and effort needed to fulfil 
requests, rather than to the materials in question being patented. 
Anticommons concerns are flagged as an issue which merits ongoing 
monitoring, and the possibility that this might become a bigger problem in 
the future is not ruled out (Directorate for Science and Policy Programs, 
2007; Mowery et ai, 2001; Walsh et ai, 2003). Suggestions for tackling the 
concerns include the establishment of patent pools or administrative law 
arbitration processes to assign value to various upstream contributions and 
determine the distribution of benefits accordingly (eg Boettiger and 
Bennett, 2006; Kesselheim and Avorn, 2005; Merges, 1996). However, as 
the recent work of Walsh and his colleagues shows (Walsh et ai, 2005; 
Walsh et ai, 2007), overcoming restrictions on access to biomedical 
research inputs will require moving beyond debates about the effects of 
patenting, and taking into account the prevailing practices and norms in this 
area of research more broadly. 
3.3 How Do These Controversies Influence the Decision of a PRO 
to Establish a TTO? 
In spite of the criticisms and concerns discussed in section 3.2 above, it is 
submitted in this dissertation that a TTO in some form has become an 
essential unit for PROs. At least some of the functions of a TTO, such as 
those associated with structuring the intellectual property terms of 
sponsored research and collaboration agreements, are crucial elements of 
good research management irrespective of a PRO's interest in 
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commercialising its technology or not, and are increasingly becoming a 
prerequisite for accessing research funding from certain sources (Wolson, 
2004), which often requires careful balancing of a slew of different 
interests, in order to comply with both the funder's (sometimes very 
detailed) requirements and relevant internal policies. It is therefore argued 
that the more useful question for a PRO to examine is the appropriate form 
and function of a no capable of meeting its particular needs, rather than 
whether or not a no is required and/or desirable at all. 
The complexities highlighted in section 3.2.6 in particular indicate the 
importance to any PRO engaged in biomedical research of being able to 
negotiate access to research tools owned by others, as well as being able 
to make appropriate decisions as to how to protect and disseminate 
optimally those research tools it develops itself. As such, it might be 
argued that the problem of restricted access to research tools demands an 
effective no. Whether or not regulated by guidelines such as those of the 
NIH, nos can be selective about the technologies they choose to patent, 
as well as in respect of the terms under which they make their patented 
technologies and tangible research materials available to others. TTO 
decisions with regard to patenting are likely to be influenced by the fact that 
where others are patenting prolifically in a particular space, a decision not 
to patent oneself could restrict one's own freedom-to-operate in that space. 
But the no can always then issue licenses on favourable terms for 
research purposes. 
Nonetheless, the impact of the associated transaction costs should not be 
underestimated, not least because it is likely to be amplified for under-
resourced and inexperienced nos, which will for example be less well-
equipped to conduct the necessary intellectual property due diligence. This 
has implications for policy, which should be designed wherever possible to 
reduce transaction costs. 
It can therefore be suggested in conclusion that the concerns discussed 
above can for the most part be addressed by examining the policies, 
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practices and choices of TTOs and the PROs in which they are located, 
and the environment in which they operate. It is further maintained here 
that wise policy guidance and proactive, strategic management can help 
ensure that technology transfer activities are carried out in alignment with 
institutional, sectoral, regional, national and/or broader development needs, 
as appropriate. This dissertation therefore supports as a corollary that the 
challenge for government policymakers is to craft policy instruments which 
will create the right balance of private incentives and public benefits, and to 
permit enough flexibility to allow approaches at the institution level to be 
tailored to their particular needs and environment. Chapters 4 and 5 which 
follow will therefore explore different government policy approaches, both 
internationally and in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
INTERNATIONAL POLICIES GOVERNING TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER IN PUBLIC RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides examples of technology transfer policy approaches 
adopted by various countries. No discussion of this topic would be 
complete without examining the US 8ayh-Dole Act, deemed to be the key 
catalyst in spurring technology transfer activities in US universities. A 
handful of other countries were also selected for discussion. These include 
Canada (as an example of a country with an established technology 
transfer system that is not regulated by legislation, despite various policy 
processes undertaken over a period of several years), Denmark 
(representing a country which introduced legislation in order to shift 
ownership of intellectual property from academics to PROs), France 
(exemplifying the use of legislation aimed at strengthening PRO-industry 
linkages and stimulating the development of spin-out companies based on 
PRO technologies) and Italy (where legislation served to transfer 
ownership from employing institutions to individual researchers, counter to 
the predominant trends elsewhere). Less English language literature is 
available for the European countries discussed. Furthermore, most of the 
relevant policy developments have been fairly recent. As a result, the 
policy analysis presented in relation to these countries is necessarily less 
detailed. 
It should be emphasised that this section does not constitute a 
comprehensive review of international policies. Nor are the featured 
countries intended to be representative of best practice. This sample is 
nonetheless useful to illustrate a variety of different policy objectives and 
approaches, necessitated by different circumstances prevailing at the time 
of the relevant developments in the countries concerned. 
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4.2 United States of America 
Although some US universities have a history of technology transfer activity 
predating the Bayh-Dole Act, 11,12 the upsurge of TTOs in US universities is 
owed primarily to Bayh-Dole, a 1980 statute enacted to promote the 
transfer of technology developed with use of federal funds by universities 
and other non-profit and small business grantees (and subsequently 
extended to all recipients of federal research grants) (Henderson and 
Smith, 2002).13 
The character of the US R&D system in the second half of the twentieth 
century was heavily influenced by Bush's Science, The Endless Frontier 
report (1945), which called for substantial support for basic science, on the 
assumption that this would provide the 'starting material' for technological 
innovation, which would logically ensue downstream. This view, 
delineating separate roles for basic and applied research at different ends 
of the spectrum, is captured in the report (1945:12): 
Basic research is performed without thought of practical ends. It results in 
general knowledge and an understanding of nature and its laws. This 
general knowledge provides the means of answering a large number of 
important practical problems, though it may not give a complete specific 
answer to anyone of them. The function of applied research is to provide 
such complete answers. The scientist doing basic research may not be at 
all interested in the practical applications of his work, yet the further 
progress of industrial development would eventually stagnate if basic 
scientific research were long neglected. 
While Bush continues to be acknowledged as a visionary, this linear model 
has been criticised as an incomplete and/or inaccurate depiction of the 
11 Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980 (PL 96-517). 
12 For further information on pre-Bayh-Dole technology transfer mechanisms in the US, 
see for example Colyvas et ai, 2002; Colyvas, 2007; Mowery et ai, 2001; Mowery et ai, 
2004; Sampat, 2006. 
13 Technology transfer in federal laboratories is governed by another 1980 statute, the 
Stevenson-Wydler Act (PL 96-480). Over the years, the initial statutes have been 
amended and supplemented by additional legislation, regulations, and other instruments. 
Reference to Bayh-Dole in this dissertation will for the most part allude to the collective 
documents of relevance, unless the context indicates otherwise. 
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relationship between science and technology, and of government's role in 
the system.14 One way of viewing Bayh-Dole, then, it might be suggested, 
is as an intervention necessitated by a failure in Bush's model, which did 
not lead to the envisaged degree of 'conversion' of basic research into 
innovative technologies. 15 
One of the key changes brought about by Bayh-Dole in the US was to give 
grantees a blanket right to own the intellectual property in their federally-
funded technology. Previously, this was in many cases owned by the 
government, which had a poor record of successful exploitation of the 
thousands of patents it held.16 In other cases, some federal agencies 
allowed certain university grantees to hold title to intellectual property under 
Institutional Patent Agreements, negotiated between a particular university 
and agency respectively, applying to all research funded by that agency at 
the university concerned (Mowery et ai, 2001). Policymakers believed that 
the impact of taxpayer-supported federal research funding would be 
increased by providing a uniform framework which incentivised universities 
to become actively involved in the commercialisation of their technology by 
having the right to elect to own it, and incentivised industry to invest in 
further development for the manufacture and sale of goods by allowing 
companies to acquire exclusive licenses. This was expected to lead to 
useful new products on the market, job creation and the establishment of 
new businesses, which could contribute to economic development and 
provide a far higher return to taxpayers on their investment in the federal 
14 One apposite critique is put forth in Stokes's Pasteur's Quadrant (1997). While 
recognising that basic research might involve a quest for fundamental understanding 
without considering how that knowledge might be used ('pure basic research'), and that 
applied research might be 'guided solely by applied goals without seeking a more general 
understanding of the phenomena of a scientific field' (1997:74) ('pure applied research'), 
Stokes identifies a category of 'use-inspired basic research', carried out with the aim of 
extending the boundaries of understanding, yet at the same time inspired by 
considerations of use (as exemplified by the work of Louis Pasteur). A linear model with 
separate defined roles for basic and applied research respectively cannot accommodate 
research of this nature. 
15 Interestingly, though, Sampat (2006) reports that although The Endless Frontier is silent 
in this regard, Bush was a strong supporter of the premise of contractor ownership of 
intellectual property. 
16 The observation made in Mowery et al (2001 :103) should however be noted, namely 
that most of these patents did not emanate from university research, but rather from 
private contractors who chose not to take title. 
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research enterprise (Council On Governmental Relations, 1999; Wolson, 
2005). 
8ayh-Dole applies to all research carried out in terms of a federal funding 
contract, even where the work may be only partially government-funded. 
Grantees take on certain obligations when they elect to retain title to 
intellectual property developed under such a contract. These obligations 
include reporting to the relevant federal funding agency, filing a US patent 
application, taking active steps to commercialise the invention concerned, 
sharing any income generated from exploitation with inventors and using 
the balance of such income for research or educational purposes. 
Grantees may licence the technology concerned to industry on an 
exclusive or non-exclusive basis, but may not assign ownership rights to 
third parties other than invention management companies. 
In an effort to ensure a balance between private and public interests, the 
US government is entitled to a non-exclusive, non-transferable, worldwide, 
royalty-free right to practise the invention, and may additionally exercise 
'march-in' rights to take ownership of the technology, or to require that a 
third party be granted a licence, where this is in the public interest (eg for 
health or safety reasons, or if the invention has not been commercialised 
within a reasonable time). In addition, manufacture of products under a 
licence governed by 8ayh-Dole must take place substantially in the USA, 
and preference must be given to small business licensees, unless it can be 
shown that they lack the capacity to bring the invention to market, or unless 
a large company contributed to the research under which the invention was 
developed (in which case the co-sponsoring company would be entitled to 
a license) (Council On Governmental Relations, 1999; Valoir, 2000; 
Wolson, 2005). A contractor may lose patent rights on an invention 
developed with federal funds for failing to comply with 8ayh-Dole reporting 
requirements (Locke & Guttag, 2005). Where circumstances might require 
this, an agency may make a determination of exceptional circumstances 
which would allow ownership of intellectual property to vest in the federal 
government rather than in the grantee. This would be done prior to 
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entering into a funding agreement (Council On Governmental Relations, 
1999). 
Overall implementation of 8ayh-Dole (including the granting of exceptions) 
is overseen by the Department of Commerce. The General Accounting 
Office conducts reviews on different aspects of 8ayh-Dole implementation 
from time to time. While a national inter-agency database exists, enabling 
grantees to enter reporting data directly, individual federal agencies are 
responsible for monitoring their grantees' 8ayh-Dole compliance (Council 
On Governmental Relations, 1999). 
It has been recognised that 8ayh-Dole did not mark the beginning of 
technology transfer efforts by US universities. 17 Furthermore, the increase 
in university patenting and licensing activity seen post-1980 must also be 
viewed in the context of other concurrent developments of the day. These 
include the burgeoning of areas of biotechnology and software research 
and availability of new techniques, yielding results of special interest to 
industry, increased emphasis in US policy on strong intellectual property 
property protection, and judicial rulings (beginning with the Supreme Court 
judgment in Diamond v Chakrabarty in 1980)18 which effectively expanded 
the scope of patentable subject matter, particularly biological material, 
leading to increased opportunities for patenting arising out of university 
research. Some commentators therefore believe that 8ayh-Dole served to 
'accelerate and magnify trends that already were occurring' (Colyvas et ai, 
2002:62; Mowery et ai, 2001; Mowery et ai, 2004) and that its influence in 
increasing university patent activity has thus been overstated. 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that 8ayh-Dole was the major catalyst for 
the introduction of TIOs in US universities, with most institutional 
technology transfer programmes having been set up between the mid-
1980's to the mid-1990's (AUTM, 2007a). The legislation gave rise to the 
need for a dedicated function to enable institutions to exercise the rights 
and fulfil the obligations conferred by it. 
17 Refer to footnote 12. 
18 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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While it remains relatively new in South Africa, technology transfer as an 
activity and as a profession is therefore now well-entrenched in the US 
academic system. Passman et al (2005:4) assert that delegation to 
grantee institutions of authority relating to patenting and licensing decision-
making has improved the quality of such decisions, on the assumption that 
grantees 'are typically more cognizant of private-sector activities in a given 
field of technology and, thus, better able to assess the commercial potential 
of inventions'. To illustrate some of the impact of US technology transfer 
activity, the 2006 US AUTM Licensing Survey reports that in the period 
from 1998 to 2006, 4,350 new products emanating from academic 
technology transfer activity were introduced onto the market (697 in 2006), 
and that 5,724 new spinoff companies were launched in the period from 
1980 to 2005 (553 in 2006), each based on an academic technology 
platform (AUTM, 2007a). 
Concerns about the impact of Bayh-Dole and the technology transfer 
enterprise it has created are expressed from time to time. One of the main 
criticisms of the Bayh-Dole framework is that by inSisting that research 
institutions own all intellectual property arising out of research that has 
received any federal support, collaborations with industry are discouraged, 
as companies would generally prefer to own rather than license such 
intellectual property. This is conceivably borne out by the relatively low 
percentage of industry-sponsored research at US universities, hospitals 
and research institutes, ranging from 7-10% of total research expenditure 
in the ten-year period from 1996-2005 (AUTM, 2005). In congressional 
testimony on the Bayh-Dole Act, a company representative stated that 
'companies are finding that research partnerships with foreign universities 
offer a distinct advantage with regard to intellectual property use' (Butts, 
2007:6). But despite the fact that the proportion of industry-funded 
research at US universities remains low overall, it is worth taking into 
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account that it has increased (between double and fivefold according to 
different estimates) since the inception of Bayh-Dole (Valoir, 2000).19 
Some critics object to licensee companies (and licensor universities) 
appropriating and profiting from taxpayer investments in research, 
particularly in the pharmaceutical sector, where the taxpayer may be seen 
to be 'paying twice': firstly for the research and subsequently for the 
product developed in the course of such research (cited in Remington, 
2005). Other criticisms cover much of the ground discussed in section 3.2 
above, many of which revolve around a perceived imbalance between the 
private incentives created by the Act, and the wider public interest. 
The Bayh-Dole Act is subject to congressional oversight (Remington, 
2005), and over the years, hearings have been held from time to time 
before congressional committees to assess the effectiveness and impact of 
Bayh-Dole. But for the most part, the predominant view appears to be that 
the legislation continues to achieve its objectives.2o 
Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that Bayh-Dole operates in a 
challenging environment, and its long-term survival will not be assured if it 
fails to respond adequately. Remington (2005) describes some of the 
challenges he identifies. Federal funding for basic research is stagnating, 
as well as being redirected towards defence and homeland security. 
Inadequacies in the patent system's ability to achieve an appropriate 
balance between private incentives and public benefit are being 
acknowledged, and controversial attempts to reform the patent law are 
being disputed. Calls for the federal government to exercise march-in 
rights are made periodically.21 Attempts by certain federal agencies to 
19 It is however noted that it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to assess or review 
the role of Bayh-Dole, if any, on this increase. 
20 This view is endorsed for example in the statements submitted by a panel of witnesses 
representing different stakeholders for an oversight hearing held by the Subcommittee on 
Technology and Innovation of the House Science and Technology Committee, on 17 July 
2007, available at: 
http://science.house.gov/pu blications/hearings_markups _details.aspx?NewsID=1918 
21 Since march-in rights are a key element of Bayh-Dole and an important prong in the 
attempt to balance public versus private interests, it might be questioned why Remington 
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bypass Bayh-Dole appear to be increasing (although permitted for some 
categories of defence research expenditure, there are indications that 
civilian agencies are also finding ways of making use of exceptions to 
increase their flexibility in contracting). Proposals for legislative reform are 
brought from time to time (usually in an attempt to ensure reasonable 
pricing for drugs developed with federal research support or to increase the 
rights and/or benefits accruing to federal agencies) (Remington, 2005). 
Recommendations have been made for amendments to Bayh-Dole. For 
example, some believe that federal agencies should be given greater 
discretion under Bayh-Dole to determine that certain results of publicly-
funded research be placed in the public domain (Rai and Eisenberg, 2003). 
In a case study documenting the first (ultimately unsuccessful) petition to 
the federal government to exercise its march-in rights under Bayh-Dole, 
Bar-Shalom and Cook-Deegan (2002) make four suggestions for revising 
Bayh-Dole so as to address some of these concerns. They call for the 
march-in provisions to be revisited, for a research exemption from patent 
infringement to be created, for patent re-examination procedures to be 
introduced and for provision to be made for greater transparency in 
licensing practices. In a similar vein, Boettiger and Bennett (2006), in an 
article entitled 'Bayh-Dole: if we knew then what we know now', identify 
four partly overlapping issues which they believe, if incorporated into the 
law, or at least uniformly adopted by federal agencies and grantees, could 
address the misalignment between public and private interests which has 
developed under Bayh-Dole in respect of certain technologies and certain 
TTO practices. These are provision for a research exemption to allow 
researchers to continue to use licensed intellectual property for non-
commercial research; ensuring access to research tools; concrete steps to 
(2005) regards petitions calling on government to exercise this right are considered a 
challenge to the Act. The argument would be that, since such an exercise would signal a 
limitation on or curtailment of the rights of an exclusive licensee, it might deter other 
companies from licensing PRO technology, which would reduce the effectiveness of the 
legislation. March-in petitions have not to date met with success. Many Bayh-Dole 
proponents believe that this stance has contributed to the success of the Act, while many 
detractors see this as evidence that application of the provisions is skewed in favour of 
private interests. This is discussed further in section 6.2.2.7. 
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restrict the anticommons effect caused by the fragmentation of intellectual 
property rights partly created by the increased tendency towards patent 
filing encouraged by Bayh-Dole (eg through patent pooling, open access 
license terms and clearing house mechanisms); and provision for 
humanitarian use where appropriate. 
Even while many stakeholders continue to call for legislative changes, in 
the absence of these, there remains some room under Bayh-Dole for 
flexibility in the practices adopted by US nos and federal funding 
agencies. As noted by Boettiger and Bennett (2006:320): 
Many of the issues that are identified today as negative consequences of 
Bayh-Dole can be traced to the institutional policies structured to optimize 
institutional benefits and income, rather than to the Act itself. 
While they believe that legislative amendments are probably necessary to 
bring about uniform system-wide behaviour changes by US TTOs within a 
reasonable timeframe, they acknowledge that most of the suggestions that 
they offer to preserve the public benefits of publicly funded research could, 
with the necessary political will, instead be implemented by other means. 
It is likely that Bayh-Dole will remain in the spotlight of both supporters and 
detractors, and that debate will continue about whether or not it continues 
to attain its goals, as well as about whether or not those goals remain 
relevant. It is interesting to note that even the mainstream business press 
has jumped into the fray, with a 2005 Fortune article taking a critical view, 
dubbing Bayh-Dole 'The Law of Unintended Consequences' (Leaf, 2005), 
in stark contrast to a 2002 piece in The Economist, describing it as 
'possibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in America 
over the past half-century' (The Economist, 2002). In spite of the 
controversies and unresolved issues associated with it, Bayh-Dole remains 
a precedent-setting piece of legislation, and US PROs continue to have 
some of the most productive technology transfer operations. As such, it is 
therefore submitted that no country seeking to develop or enhance its own 
technology transfer policies will embark on this process without a thorough 
examination of the US experience under Bayh-Dole. 
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4.3 Canada 
In contrast to the US approach, where legislation applying across-the-
board to all federal research funding was introduced, Canada has 
addressed the issue of commercialisation of federally-funded research 
through non-legislative policy interventions, at times distinguishing between 
different sources of funding which have had different conditions attached. 
The policy initiatives and reviews which have taken place in Canada over 
the years have generated an enormous amount of background 
documentation.22 Some of the key documents are discussed here in some 
detail, in order to illustrate the range of issues considered and the extent of 
the various debates. While Bayh-Oole and many of its proposed and 
actual provisions have been the subject of debate both before and after its 
promulgation (as discussed in section 4.2 above), these debates were not 
captured in policy documents in the same way as they have been in 
Canada. 
4.3.1 Public investment in university research by federal granting 
agencies 
An Expert Panel on the Commercialization of University Research was 
established by the Prime Minister's Advisory Council on Science and 
Technology (ACST) with a mandate to 'present a vision and 
implementation strategy to maximize the economic and social returns to 
Canada from public investments in university research' (ACST, 1999:v). 
Background papers were commissioned and written submissions solicited 
from interested parties before a draft report was compiled. After broad 
stakeholder consultations, a final report was submitted in 1999 (ACST, 
1999) (Panel Report). 
The Panel Report proceeded from the starting point that universities 
occupy a unique position to drive economic growth and social wellbeing. It 
recognised the three core functions that Canadian universities carry out, 
22 Riddle (2004) catalogues a large amount of relevant documentation. 
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namely teaching, research and community service, and stressed that 
commercialisation activities should not be pursued at the expense of these, 
but suggested that innovation ought to be incorporated into these, or 
explicitly identified as a fourth mission. It examined the innovation process 
and the university competencies required in an optimal process of 
commercialisation of research results. These can be summarised as 
follows: 
'Y Building commercialisation infrastructure - commercialisation offices or 
nos should act as a central point of entry for companies wishing to 
license university technologies and a single point of contact for 
university inventors 
'Y Recruiting and retaining highly qualified personnel - appropriate training 
and incentives must be provided 
'Y Development of innovation policies and strategies - specific policies are 
needed to regulate intellectual property ownership, conflict of interest, 
benefit-sharing, and annual innovation strategies and evaluations of 
past performance are called for by the Panel. These must be properly 
communicated to stakeholders 
'Y Facilitation of access to research funding - from both government and 
industry 
'Y Identification of discoveries with commercial application 
commercialisation offices are urged to take a proactive approach in 
seeking out suitable inventions from their researchers' laboratories, and 
in forging ties at an early stage with potential licensee firms, especially 
small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) 
'Y Intellectual property protection - intellectual property management 
strategies should go further than merely filing patent and other 
intellectual property applications, and collaborations, portfolio building 
and intellectual property bundling are encouraged 
'Y Adding value to intellectual property - this might entail drawing up 
scientific development and/or business plans, conducting market 
research and feasibility studies, or prototype development, preferably in 
conjunction with private sector partners who have relevant expertise 
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y Commercialisation of the most promising discoveries - technology 
transfer, including selection of the most appropriate pathway (eg 
licensing to a spin-out company set up especially for the purpose of 
taking the licensed technology to market, or to an existing company), 
valuation of the contribution made by the university, and in some cases 
seeking investment from the financial sector 
y Maximising the value of the public research investment - the emphasis 
should be on maximizing the value of licensee companies rather than of 
the returns to the TTO, which requires universities to provide adequate 
support to their licensees over an extended period, which can take 
various forms, including technical assistance, access to university-
owned science park or incubator facilities, or later stage investment in a 
licensee in which the university holds an equity stake. Successful 
endeavours should be visible to all parties. 
The Panel Report provides an assessment of the innovation performance 
of Canadian universities. While noting the need for better data, the Panel 
concluded that there was Significant unmet potential for this activity to 
contribute to strengthening the national economy. The factors impeding 
universities from reaching their full potential are then examined. 
The absence of a coherent university intellectual property policy was 
identified as a major obstacle. The Granting Councils did not claim 
ownership of intellectual property developed in the course of research 
which they supported, nor did they require disclosure of such intellectual 
property. Some universities had policies of university ownership, and some 
allowed researchers to own intellectual property, which mayor may not 
have been subject to an obligation to disclose the creation of intellectual 
property to the university. Some universities had not adopted explicit 
intellectual property policies at all, in which case individuals owned the 
intellectual the intellectual property they created in the course of their 
university research. This was believed to have led to the loss of 
commercialisation opportunities and the failure to capture value for 
Canada. Limited capacity and resources of universities for 
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commercialisation, uncompetitive business conditions and low levels of 
investment in university research were identified as additional barriers. 
The proposed Action Plan made six recommendations: 
"y The federal government should require its grantees to commit to 
achieving 'the greatest possible benefit to Canada', when research 
results derived from federally-funded research are commercialised. 
"y Universities should implement intellectual property policies 
incorporating stipulated principles, in order to be eligible for federal 
commercialisation support and for their researchers to qualify for federal 
research funding. Such policies would be confined to intellectual 
property with commercial potential, developed with use of federal 
funding. (Scholarly books and journal articles would be excluded.) The 
listed principl6s include an obligation for researchers to disclose 
relevant intellectual property to the university, and for the university in 
turn to make disclosures to the federal government, an obligation for 
researchers to assign intellectual property to their employing university, 
an undertaking by the university to make reasonable efforts to 
commercialise intellectual property with innovative potential, by 
transferring technologies, by means of licensing or assignment, to local 
or national companies (where possible to Canadian firms or Canadian 
subsidiaries of foreign companies, or with a commitment to value-added 
for Canada where foreign licensing is the only feasible option, and 
prioritising small businesses where appropriate) providing incentives to 
encourage researchers to create intellectual property (including benefit-
sharing and recognition in promotion and tenure policies), and setting 
up organisational capacity and responsibility for innovation activity 
arising from the institution's research. University researchers would 
retain the right to make decisions about publishing their research 
results, and could therefore choose to put these into the public domain 
rather than following a commercialisation route, even where 
commercialisation opportunities might exist. 
"y The federal government should dedicate a new stream of funding, in an 
amount equivalent to 5% of its university research investment, to be 
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earmarked for support of university commercialisation activities, and in 
addition to existing support. Universities would qualify for such funding 
by implementing policies in compliance with the recommended 
principles, reporting annually on commercialisation activity and 
submitting an annually updated innovation strategy, as a means of 
ensuring accountability. It was recommended that the Granting 
Councils jointly administer these funds to avoid unnecessary additional 
bureaucracy, and that the program be revisited after a time period, after 
which competitive support might be considered. 
y Universities should commit to build capacity and strengthen the 
commercialisation skills base, making use of the federal 
commercialisation funding it receives. The Granting Councils should 
complement these efforts by assisting in the establishment of regional 
and national networks to share knowledge, expertise and best practice 
in the field. 
y Business conditions should be improved, through a review of tax policy. 
y Government should increase its support for university research, 
including taking into account the indirect costs of research, to ensure an 
ongoing innovation pipeline. 
The Granting Councils were encouraged to report annually to the public on 
the economic and social benefits to taxpayers of the public investment in 
university research. 
The Panel Report was not very well-received by many academics (see 
Kondro, 1999). A study commissioned by ACST in 2004 to investigate 
Canadian universities' commercialisation strategies (Riddle, 2004) reports 
that the recommendations of the Expert Panel were not taken up as a 
formal position of the federal government, although certain elements were 
adopted. The recommendation on intellectual property policies proved 
especially contentious. In public consultations on the Panel Report, 
stakeholders warned that any attempt to enforce a uniform policy of 
intellectual property ownership by universities would not be effective if it did 
not have the full support of academic researchers. 
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The study reports on a multitude of Canadian policy documents, 
statements and positions put forward by different stakeholders. Substantial 
attention is devoted to private sector views. Various reports from the USA, 
the UK and Australia are also reviewed. The ownership of intellectual 
property was one factor considered, amongst a wider range of issues 
affecting the university-industry interface. The overarching view captured 
in the study was that while improvements in the system were required, the 
issue of intellectual property ownership was not considered to be a major 
obstacle to technology transfer. The study states (2004:69): 
Although a common policy for IP [intellectual property] ownership is 
favoured by most government and industry studies, retaining and building 
upon the good-will of university researchers is even more important. 
Simply put, although it is desirable, institutional ownership of IP is seen by 
the private sector as neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
success. Of greatest importance is the need for unity of ownership at the 
point of commercialization, and in this regard the Quebec policy on IP is 
viewed as a good model. Rather than waiting for government action, 
universities might exert greater efforts to document best practices and 
demonstrate their contention that diversity of ownership is not an 
impediment when inventors and their institutions are actively engaged in 
commercialization. 
The Quebecois intervention, singled out in the study as an example of best 
practice, merits further discussion. 
4.3.2 Quebec Intellectual Property Action Plan 
The Quebec Intellectual Property Action Plan (QIPAP) (Government of 
Quebec, 2002) was an outcome of the provincial science and innovation 
policy. It acknowledges the benefits of a harmonised approach to 
intellectual property, while at the same time recognising the importance of 
stakeholder buy-in (2002:5): 
The way forward lies in building consensus among all partners. The Action 
Plan is to become the instrument for such consensus building. An effective 
system for commercial development must rest on clear, agreed-upon 
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guidelines. In the current circumstances, implementation of the Action Plan 
will largely depend on support from all players in research, commercial 
development, and innovation. 
Compliance is strongly encouraged, but nonetheless voluntary, although it 
is reported that at least one provincial funding council requires adherence 
to the Action Plan as a condition for disbursing funding (Riddle, 2004). 
The QIPAP is based on six fundamental values: 
~ Academic freedom - researchers have the right to decide whether or not 
they wish to commercialise their research results 
~ Respect for the fundamental missions of institutions - intellectual 
property policies must make teaching and research easier to pursue 
~ Public interest - may require a limited restriction on academic freedom 
(eg a publication delay voluntarily agreed to by the researcher involved, 
to facilitate prior patenting as a condition for commercialisation) 
~ Commercial development begins with the researcher - but the 
researcher must also recognise the different intersecting roles and 
interests of several other participants in the process 
~ Intellectual integrity - researchers and institutions must be governed by 
the principles of ethics in carrying out their research activities 
~ Transparency and accountability - on the part of all roleplayers in the 
commercialisation process, in respect of the research community, 
government and the public. 
Five principles of action are then defined: 
~ Responsibility of all stakeholders to transfer research findings to society 
- this begins with the disclosure of inventions to the institution by any 
researcher who intends to pursue commercialisation 
~ Obligation of the institution and its commercial development partners to 
respond speedily and effectively - rights should be released to the 
researcher in the event that the institution chooses not to exploit the 
intellectual property concerned 
~ Exclusive ownership of intellectual property once the commercial 
development process has begun - the starting point is joint ownership of 
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intellectual property by the institution and responsible researchers, with 
the expectation that once the institution makes a commitment to 
commercialisation, the researchers will assign their rights to the 
institution to simplify negotiations by avoiding the involvement of 
multiple parties. Researchers retain the right to share in any benefits 
generated from commercialisation. Conversely, where rights are 
released back to the inventor, the institution will then be expected to 
cede its rights to the inventor, to enable the inventor to manage the 
process, on terms agreed in advance. Under certain circumstances, 
exceptions might be permitted. 
>- Partnership between researchers and institutions - ideally, neither party 
should dominate the other, as both play crucial roles in the process 
>- Fairness - all intellectual contributions throughout the process should be 
recognised (including in scientific publications, patent applications, 
revenue-sharing, and equity shares in spin-out companies). A rule of 
thumb is established for 50% of net revenues to be distributed to the 
institution and 50% to the researcher/s, with the proviso that specific 
benefit-sharing agreements may be individually structured. 
Responsibilities of the various parties and timelines for their 
implementation actions are set out. It is observed that practices evolve 
quickly in this field, which makes it difficult to lay down all rules in advance. 
It is therefore acknowledged that changes might become necessary. 
Provision is thus made for a review process. 
4.3.3 R&D funding from Crown procurement contracts 
Crown procurement contracts represent a subset of Canadian government 
funding for PRO research. The policy review process of the intellectual 
property terms of such funding which took place is therefore discussed 
here. In respect of Crown procurement contracts, Canada departed from a 
previous situation of ownership by the federal government of intellectual 
property developed out of federally-funded research, as was the case in 
the USA prior to Bayh-Dole, but adopted a different approach in doing so: a 
policy route was followed rather than legislation (DECO, 2003). 
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A 1991 Policy on Title to Intellectual Property Arising under Crown 
Contracts, acknowledging that the private sector is best placed to 
commercialise intellectual property, allowed contractors to own the 
intellectual property they generated in the course of carrying out Crown 
procurement contracts (especially, but not limited to, R&D contracts), 
subject to a range of exceptions. Implementation was however 
accompanied by various difficulties, associated with uncertainty as to the 
overall scope of the policy. This was a consequence of ambiguous 
interpretations of the exceptions, inconsistent application by different 
government departments and perceived conflicting objectives with other 
policies. This led to a review of the policy (set in motion by a 1995 
evaluation of the status of the policy), in terms of which three options were 
considered: 
)r Retaining the 1991 policy, but providing assistance and training with 
regard to its implementation 
)r Introducing legislation along the lines of 8ayh-Dole 
)r Revising the 1991 policy so as to retain its key principles, while 
addressing its weaknesses and removing its ambiguities (OECD, 2003). 
The third option was subsequently selected, as the one best able to 
accommodate the flexibility required by different government departments 
as well as the needs of contractors. This resulted in the 2000 Policy on 
Title to Intellectual Property Arising under Crown Contracts, which clarified 
the scope and application of the policy, as well as the exceptions to 
contractor ownership, in addition to introducing certain other provisions (eg 
preference for commercialising within Canada and/or within a certain time 
frame, monitoring and reporting obligations) (OECD, 2003). Concern has 
however been expressed that even the revised policy has not been fully 
embraced, and for some stakeholders, legislation is the preferred approach 
(Clarke, 2000, revised 2005). 
The Canadian approach is notable for several reasons: the underlying 
research commissioned and the consultations held in the course of the 
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policy development process; the importance assigned to the support of 
researchers as critical stakeholders, as well as to stakeholder buy-in more 
generally; and receptiveness to a more flexible voluntary approach rather 
than a strictly prescribed one. The absence of legislation to date, despite 
comprehensive policy processes spanning several years, appears to be at 
least to some extent a consequence of stakeholder resistance (implied by 
some of the events and processes chronicled in Riddle's 2004 ACST 
study). Nonetheless, while some might argue that the policy mechanisms 
ought to be improved (eg Clarke, 2000, revised 2005) many Canadian 
PROs have thriving technology transfer operations, which would seem to 
indicate that legislation is not a prerequisite for effective technology 
transfer. 
4.4 Denmark 
Probably the main focal point for Danish policy interventions on PRO 
technology transfer was to shift ownership of intellectual property 
developed at universities from individual researchers to the university. 
Prior to 2000, Danish university researchers (although not researchers in 
other PROs) were permitted to own intellectual property they developed in 
the course of their university research. This was part of a 'teacher's 
exception' applying specifically to university lecturers and researchers, and 
departed from the general legal position of employer-owned intellectual 
property. As a result, few Danish universities had nos. University 
scientists rarely applied for patents in their personal capacities, although in 
some cases assigned their rights to industry research sponsors or 
collaborators (OECD, 2003). 
The situation changed with the introduction of the Act on Inventions at 
Public Research Institutions in 2000, intended to ensure that publicly 
funded research results would 'be utilized for the Danish society through 
commercial exploitation' (Valentin and Jensen, 2007:260). The new 
legislation gave PROs the right to take ownership of their researchers' 
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inventions, as well as of inventions derived from collaborative research with 
industry, unless the university agreed to waive this right in advance. 
The legislation requires PRO researchers to disclose all relevant inventions 
(those which are patentable or capable of utility model protection) to their 
employing institution, which then has a period of two months in which to 
decide whether or not it wishes to claim title to the relevant invention. If the 
institution chooses not to take up rights, the inventor is entitled to exploit 
the invention independently, subject to sharing net income with the PRO. If 
the institution does take title, the inventor is entitled to share in the financial 
benefits accruing to the PRO from successful commercialisation of the 
invention concerned. While the legislation permits PROs to take equity in a 
licensee company in lieu of some or all license fees, universities and 
national laboratories are not permitted to spin out companies themselves 
(although hospitals are not subject to this limitation) (OECD, 2003). 
The Act which eventually passed was of somewhat reduced scope 
compared to what was initially proposed, after an earlier draft met with 
strong disapproval from universities and other stakeholders. In particular, 
the scope of the legislation was limited to inventions that could be 
protected by patents or utility models (instead of applying to all 'intangible 
rights'), and the period in which an institution must elect to take title of 
relevant intellectual property was reduced (to two months) (OECD, 2003). 
To facilitate implementation, a working group was set up, consisting of 
experienced technology transfer practitioners from national laboratories 
with established TTOs and representatives from universities and hospitals, 
with observers from stakeholder government departments. The working 
group developed standard forms, processes and lists of elements to 
consider in relevant agreements, while allowing for some degree of 
institutional flexibility in adopting these in a manner consistent with 
individual institutional culture and structures. Assistance for 
implementation was made available via parliamentary grants, accessed on 
an application basis, to cover external costs such as patenting fees and 
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marketing costs, but could not be used to support the costs of setting up or 
running a no (DECO, 2003). 
Initially, many PROs merely assigned an administrator to carry out 
technology transfer functions, but over time, the need for well-staffed 
dedicated offices became apparent, and larger nos were set up in many 
PROs, mainly funded internally, but sometimes in conjunction with some 
government support (DECO, 2003; Valentin and Jensen, 2007). 
A recent study set out to examine the effects of the Act, by comparing 
inventorship on both industry-owned and university-owned patents of 
Danish and Swedish university researchers, before and after the 
introduction of the legislation (Valentin and Jensen, 2007). Sweden's 
policy permitting university researchers to own intellectual property rights in 
their research results closely resembles the Danish situation prior to the 
enactment of the law, so the Swedish data can serve as a type of control in 
this comparative approach. 
The enquiry focused on dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) specialising 
in drug discovery, an industry sector in which university collaborations are 
common, and which shares a similar history and structure in the two 
countries. It was found that Danish university-industry collaborations in 
drug discovery declined after the Act came into force, with fewer Danish 
university researchers being named as inventors on DBF patents. This 
was accompanied by evidence of substitution of non-Danish university 
scientists as participants in Danish DBF inventor teams. No corresponding 
shift was apparent from the Swedish data, and the authors could find no 
factor other than the Danish legislation to account for the different 
behaviour observed in the two countries. While some increase could be 
seen in inventorship of Danish academic researchers on university-owned 
patents, this was not high enough to compensate for the decline 
experienced in academic contributions to the industry patents. The authors 
therefore conclude that significant academic inventive potential, previously 
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manifested in participation in industry patents, has been rendered inactive 
by the new Danish legislation. 
This would appear to be an unintended consequence of the Danish Act 
which, if it was meeting its goals, would have resulted in this inventive 
capacity being channelled into university patents. As such, the new law is 
deemed to have had detrimental effects on this type of collaboration, and to 
have impeded domestic academic researchers' contributions to industry 
patents. The authors do however qualify their findings, pointing out that 
they apply specifically to university-industry collaborations involving early-
stage, exploratory research, where outcomes are uncertain. It therefore 
becomes a risky decision for either party to agree in advance to assign 
ownership of intellectual property to the other, as the potential value of 
such intellectual property remains impossible to calculate at that stage. For 
research projects occurring further downstream along the R&D value chain 
(ie situated closer to the market), they acknowledge that there is evidence 
that the legislative framework has been more successful. 
While the Danish experiences under the new framework are still fairly 
recent, lessons can be extracted from the policy process followed in 
introducing the legislation, which was relatively responsive to stakeholder 
input, and which allowed for stakeholder participation in shaping 
implementation. The Valentin and Jensen study provides a cautionary tale 
of potential unintended consequences in at least one industry sector, while 
tentatively suggesting that there might be value in examining the use of 
different approaches for different types of technologies. 
4.5 France 
France provides an example of a country which introduced legislation with 
a somewhat different emphasis: namely, to address structural weaknesses 
identified in their innovation system, which were identified as responsible 
for preventing more effective technology transfer from taking place 
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between PROs and industry. According to French law, inventions 
developed by salaried employees are generally owned or required to be 
assigned to the employer, unless completely unrelated to the employer's 
business. Provision is made for inventors in specified categories to receive 
additional remuneration under certain circumstances, according to certain 
decrees. Since PROs owned the intellectual property arising from publicly 
funded PRO research even before the legislation came into force, the 
ownership question was not addressed (OECD, 2003). 
The Law for Innovation and Research23 which took effect in 1999 aims to 
strengthen linkages between PROs and industry and encourage the 
establishment of innovative start-up companies based on technologies 
developed by PROs. The legislation allows for greater mobility of 
researchers, by allowing them to work for companies which are further 
developing their research, while retaining their position as PRO 
researchers for a certain time period, provided that permission is obtained 
from the PRO prior to establishment of the company. The legislation 
further provides for the setting up of incubators by PROs, providing 
equipment, space and other support for fledgling companies, particularly 
technology-based companies of PRO researchers. Other provisions cover 
the establishment of TTOs, especially at universities, which prior to 1999 
did not have such functions. (One reason for this is that most intellectual 
property developed in French universities at that time was generated in 
joint research laboratories - ie a partnership between another PRO and a 
university - where the other PRO would control such intellectual property.) 
A range of enabling fiscal and legal measures was also introduced by the 
legislation (OECD, 2003). 
While the legislation tackled various legal constraints, it was recognised 
that cultural barriers to implementation had to be surmounted. Bearing in 
mind that universities and their researchers did not have experience in the 
protection and exploitation of intellectual property, an early priority in 
23 Law No 99-587 of 12 July 1999. 
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implementing the legislation was the drawing up of detailed 
recommendations for institutional intellectual property management and 
industry partnerships, by representatives of government, industry and 
PROs. These recommendations, which appeared in 2001, were designed 
to guide PROs in the development of their own policies (OECD, 2003). 
Recognising the need for additional complementary measures to increase 
support for R&D in France and to foster innovative companies, an 
Innovation Plan was unveiled in 2003 as a joint initiative of the ministries of 
Industry and Research respectively. The Innovation Plan introduced a 
series of tax incentives (for business angels, innovative small companies 
and R&D by firms in general); simplification of innovation incentive 
schemes; incentives for patenting, public-private R&D collaboration; 
support for incubators and start-up companies; measures to attract 
students to science and technology careers; and the establishment of 
centres of excellence for strategic industrial R&D (OECD, 2003 and 
http://www.insme.org/page.asp?IDArea=1 &page=financings&action=detail 
&IDObject=20&IDObjectType=11, accessed 10 February 2008). 
The French legislation, supplemented with the implementation 
recommendations and the Innovation Plan, demonstrates a targeted 
approach aimed at addressing specific structural weaknesses. 
Implementation by means of flexible guiding recommendations, drafted in a 
collaborative effort by representatives of all stakeholders, rather than by 
means of rigid mandated rules, appears to have been an appropriate route 
to follow. The Innovation Plan filled an important gap by focusing (mainly) 
on industry needs. 
4.6 Italy 
Italy is briefly mentioned as an example of a country which has departed 
from the predominant trend of policy convergence towards PRO ownership 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
THE EVOLVING POLICY LANDSCAPE FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM PRO'S IN SOUTH AFRICA 
of intellectual property. 2001 legislation24 gave academic inventors the 
right to own the intellectual property they develop in the course of their 
research (Cesaroni and Piccaluga, 2005; Milken Institute, 2006; OECD, 
2003). The rationale underlying this change was based on the 
assumptions that this would function as an effective incentive to encourage 
PRO scientists to engage in technology transfer activities, and that 
inventors, due to intimate knowledge of their technologies, are best-placed 
to identify potential applications and commercial partners. Under this 
model, the inventors are generally responsible for commercialisation costs, 
including patenting fees. Researchers may however enter into agreements 
with their employing institutions, in which the PRO takes on 
commercialisation responsibilities. This mayor may not entail assignment 
of intellectual property to the PRO, but will involve benefit-sharing. One 
study reports that there is no evidence of an increase in inventor-owned 
patent applications since the passage of the law (Cesaroni and Piccaluga, 
2005). 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has attempted to provide a brief outline of the policy 
approaches of the selected countries, highlighting those aspects deemed 
to be of greatest relevance to the subject matter of this dissertation, and 
extracting some potential lessons for South African policy, discussed 
further in Chapter 6. As such, this does not constitute a comprehensive or 
detailed review. It is nonetheless hoped that this chapter succeeds in 
illustrating the diversity of policy approaches adopted in the handful of 
countries examined, and thus in conveying the message that there is no 
single accepted approach to policy PRO technology transfer globally. The 
multitude of available options can in theory assist in informing the 
development of policy well-suited to a country's particular national needs. 
24 National Law No 383. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN SOUTH AFRICA: PRACTICES 
AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
The relevant South African policy environment pertaining to the IPR 
Framework and Draft Bill is discussed in this chapter, in order to provide 
sufficient context for the policy critique which follows in Chapter 6. A brief 
overview of technology transfer in South African PROs is given, based 
mainly on personal knowledge and observation of, and participation in, the 
system, before looking at the policy history leading up to the release of the 
IPR Framework, and the subsequent Draft Bill. The main features of these 
documents are summarised. Other selected policy and regulatory 
developments which impact on technology transfer, or have the potential to 
do so, are also mentioned. This is done with relative brevity, and does not 
claim to cover all potentially relevant South African policies and 
developments comprehensively, due to space constraints and a decision to 
focus here in greater depth on the specific policy under consideration, 
namely the policy on intellectual property rights from publicly financed 
research. Further, while it is explicitly acknowledged that the broader 
innovation policy environment will of course impact directly on the success 
or failure of any technology transfer interventions, it is noted that this has 
been examined in detail elsewhere, (notably in the 2007 OECD review of 
South Africa's innovation policy (OECD, 2007), as well as in Kraak (2007)). 
5.2 Current Status of Technology Transfer Practice in South Africa 
In South Africa, a handful of TIOs were established in the late 1990's, at 
the initiative of the institutions themselves, who recognised the need and 
were willing to devote some resources to the activity. These PROs 
included certain science councils and some of the more research-intensive 
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universities.25 This pre-dated active government involvement in promoting 
technology transfer from PROs, which began shortly thereafter. Other 
PROs have more recently set up technology transfer operations, 
sometimes at the urging of and/or in partnership with a government 
agency, while some PROs have yet to put in place a TIO. 
Currently, not all South African universities have explicit intellectual 
property policies, and where policies are in place, these are not uniform 
across institutions. In some cases, intellectual property is owned by 
individuals (unless specifically assigned, for example as a condition for the 
award of certain funding), and in other cases, by the university, depending 
on internal policies, conditions of employment and student rules. Rights to 
ownership of student intellectual property varies widely, even for 
universities with clear policies which provide for institutional ownership of 
staff intellectual property. Where rights are assigned to the university, 
proceeds generated from the exploitation of intellectual property are 
generally shared between the institution (typically divided amongst multiple 
entities within the institution, such as research grouping, department, 
faculty and/or centrally) and the individual inventor/s concerned, according 
to a formula set out in the intellectual property policy. The institution 
frequently assigns rights to a funder in exchange for research funding. 
This occurs both in respect of certain public sector and private sector 
funders, and mayor may not include an obligation on the part of the 
assignee to share any future benefits derived from the exploitation of the 
intellectual property concerned with the institution (Wolson, 2007). 
While several TTOs have by now accumulated some degree of experience 
and expertise, and while it is acknowledged that they generally adhere to 
professional standards and follow good practice, the perception prevails, 
25 Six PROs participated in a technology transfer assessment exercise in 2003. These 
were: Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Medical Research Council, 
Northwest University, Stellenbosch University, University of Cape Town and University of 
Pretoria (who at the time, carried out their technology transfer activities in a joint venture 
with the CSIR). 
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both within organisations themselves and externally, that South African 
nos are not performing as well as they ought to be. 
Little quantitative data is available on the technology transfer performance 
of SA PROs, and the information that does exist (usually made available on 
an informal, collegial basis rather than as part of a systematic data-
gathering exercise) is generally not comparable across institutions, who do 
not uniformly track the same internal metrics.26 The small sample size 
compounds the problem (Wolson, 2007). It is thus difficult to quantify 
performance meaningfully, or to attempt to benchmark against other 
systems internationally. This is therefore an area ripe for further research. 
Heher (2005) has made some tentative projections on the kind of returns 
that South African universities might collectively expect to generate once 
their technology transfer activities reach a level of maturity, using a 
dynamic model he has constructed based on international technology 
transfer benchmarking data. He suggests that (2005:222): 
If South Africa were to attain an innovation performance similar to 
comparable institutions elsewhere, the entire South African higher 
education research system would be expected to generate 200 to 300 
invention disclosures per annum - when operating at international norms of 
efficiency (ie trained staff are in place). After seven to ten years this should 
lead to a portfolio of around 500 active licences, two of which would be 
likely to be generating revenue of greater than $1 m per annum, and with 
total revenue of R20 to R40m per annum. Furthermore, the distribution of 
returns will almost certainly be skewed, even amongst the five or six major 
research universities, let alone the fifteen smaller institutions. A few 
institutions are likely to perform relatively well, while the majority are likely 
to operate at a net loss, even after ten or fifteen years. Furthermore, the 
skewness and variability of returns means that it is not possible to predict 
who is likely to succeed and who is likely to 'fail'. Given the financial 
constraints that exist in higher education institutions, the continuation of 
26 For the past three years, PROs have been required to report to a national agency on 
their technology transfer activity, but this data has not been made public in raw or 
aggregated format. It is understood, from personal communication with agency officials, 
that it is intended that at least national level data will eventually be made public. 
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institutional support for technology transfer is likely to be at risk, unless 
external support or stimulus is provided. 
Irrespective of the dearth of specific data, however, few will dispute that the 
returns generated from technology transfer activities by South African 
PROs to date remain relatively low. Various contributing factors can be 
identified. Some of these are described in Wolson (2007). The pipeline of 
invention disclosures is thin. Since the number of potential disclosures is 
related to institutional R&D expenditure (Heher, 2005), a smaller system is 
likely to yield fewer disclosures. Furthermore, researchers are often 
reluctant to make disclosures, whether due to lack of interest or incentive, 
or scepticism about the academic technology transfer endeavour. The 
costs of patenting are high, and many institutions do not have adequate 
budget to pursue international filings. While there is a growing cadre of 
technology transfer practitioners, capacity remains limited, as do capacity-
building opportunities. Finally, licensing opportunities are scarce. 
Domestic firms will often not have the markets or distribution channels to 
ensure viable exploitation, and marketing to overseas companies can be 
difficult without a track record or personal contacts to facilitate meaningful 
linkages, not to mention costly. At the same time, start-up opportunities for 
new businesses are few and far between, as finance is not easily raised 
from risk-averse financial institutions and venture capitalists. Angel 
investors are few and far between. 
Concerns also exist about the 'leakage' of intellectual property which 
although developed in South African PROs, gets exploited overseas, 
without due benefits being realised. Some believe that examples of this 
are widespread. Although this was investigated in a Lost Technology 
Commercialisation Opportunities study undertaken by the Department of 
Science and Technology (DST), the study has not been made publicly 
available (Department of Science and Technology, 2007a). 
The tentative nature of the observations made in this section is noted, and 
further research is required to confirm them and elaborate on them. 
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5.3 SA Policy Context 
While on the one hand, certain PROs are reflecting on and reassessing 
their technology transfer strategies, and on the other hand, evidence 
suggests that industry does not appear to rely much on PROs as a source 
of innovation (Department of Science and Technology, 2007b), government 
has proposed new legislation on Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly 
Financed Research in an effort to address this situation. In early 
discussions, this was touted as a 'South African Bayh-Dole Act'. Without 
derogating from the inspiration provided by Bayh-Dole, or the applicability 
of certain Bayh-Dole provisions which may be adopted, it is submitted that 
the elimination of the 'Bayh-Dole' descriptor from the current South African 
discourse is appropriate, bearing in mind differences in the prevailing 
conditions and rationale, and significant departures from Bayh-Dole in the 
current policy and legislative documents. 
The pending South African legislation (discussed in more detail in section 
5.5) proposes that all institutions which receive public financing for 
research have a TTO (referred to as an 'Intellectual Property Management 
Office' or 'IPMO'), and in addition prescribes a range of requirements for 
the functions of such offices, internal institutional policies and permissible 
technology transfer practices, as well as conferring certain rights on the 
State in respect of intellectual property covered by the statute. At the same 
time, a range of other policies and programmes are impacting upon the 
effective harnessing of the benefits of publicly funded research for 
economic and social development. 
The following section 5.4 provides a very brief overview of the relevant 
policy history leading up to the development of the IPR Framework and 
Draft Bill. A snapshot of selected documents is presented, in which those 
aspects most pertinent to the IPR Framework and Draft Bill are highlighted, 
in order to set the context. Key provisions of these documents are then 
described in section 5.5 (without in-depth comment, as a critique follows in 
Chapter 6). Other selected policy factors of relevance to the objectives of 
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the IPR Framework and Draft Bill are mentioned in section 5.6, in an effort 
to demonstrate the need for considering the broader context, without 
attempting to provide comprehensive coverage of all relevant policies or 
policy considerations. While acknowledging the importance of such a 
review, it is deemed to be beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
5.4 Policy Development Leading up to the IPR Framework and Draft 
Bill 
The 1996 White Paper on Science and Technology (Department of Arts, 
Culture, Science and Technology, 1996) established the concept of a 
National System of Innovation for South Africa and created the framework 
for key enabling policies and strategies to inform the strategic development 
of science and technology in the country. 
The National R&D Strategy (Department of Science and Technology, 2002) 
was drawn up in 2002 in order to improve the impact of the White Paper by 
identifying strategic interventions to address identified weaknesses, in an 
effort to ensure that the vision articulated in the White Paper is sustained. It 
is based on three pillars, namely: innovation (achieving mastery of 
technological change in the economy and society), human capital and 
transformation (increasing investment in South Africa's science base) and 
alignment and delivery (creating an effective government science and 
technology system). The R&D Strategy commits government to increase 
its share of spending on research, development and innovation, and 
provides the over-arching framework for several other interventions. These 
include the National Biotechnology Strategy,27 the National 
Nanotechnology Strategy, the Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
Strategy, and R&D tax incentives.28 
27 This is discussed in some detail in Wolson (2005). 
28 See www.dst.gov.za. 
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Particularly relevant to the development of the IPR Framework is the 
concept of an 'innovation chasm', introduced in the R&D Strategy to 
describe the gap which exists between the knowledge generators 
(especially PROs) and the market. Despite the presence of some strong 
linkages between industry and PROs, local innovation has apparently had 
little impact on economic growth, with South African technology-led 
companies commonly accessing their technology from abroad. Legislation 
aimed at improving the protection and management of intellectual property 
from publicly financed research is one of the mechanisms mooted in the 
R&D Strategy to assist in bridging the innovation chasm, together with the 
establishment of a fund to finance the costs of obtaining intellectual 
property protection in certain circumstances. 
Another element of the R&D Strategy of interest to the IPR Framework and 
Draft Bill is the recommendation that a core agency be set up for the 
stimulation and intensification of technological innovation, by aligning, co-
ordinating and providing a single point of strategic direction for a range of 
existing and anticipated innovation support instruments. Support for this 
proposal can be found in the review of South African innovation policy 
undertaken by the OECD (2007). The review highlights the absence of 
holistic governance of the components of the innovation system as a 
weakness in the South African innovation system and suggests that a high 
level government agency to integrate research and innovation policies and 
instruments across government departments would be beneficial. 
Moves are underway to give effect to the R&D Strategy's recommendation 
in this regard, through the drafting of a Technology Innovation Agency Bill29 
and the development of a business case. It is intended that the 
Technology Innovation Agency (TIA)3o be established in 2008, pending 
promulgation of the legislation and approval of the business case by 
Cabinet. However, initially at least, it is proposed that the TIA house only 
29 Bill 49 of 2007. 
30 While the R&D Strategy refers to the proposed agency as the 'Foundation for 
Technological Innovation', it has since been renamed the 'Technology Innovation Agency'. 
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those 'TIA building blocks currently administered by the DST or the DST 
family of public institutions' (Department of Science and Technology, 
2007a:39), implying that innovation support measures falling under other 
departments, primarily the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) will not 
be brought under the TIA umbrella. As such, it is submitted that the TIA's 
capacity to integrate innovation efforts across multiple government 
departments, as recommended by the OECD review (2007), is likely to be 
constrained. 
DST also brought out a Ten-Year Innovation Plan in 2007 which aims to 
'help drive South Africa's transformation towards a knowledge-based 
economy, in which the production and dissemination of knowledge leads to 
economic benefits and enriches all fields of human endeavour' 
(Department of Science and Technology, 2007c:iv). This document 
contains proposals directly relevant to the objectives of the IPR Framework 
and Draft Bill. One of the four drivers identified to make progress in this 
regard is 'enablers to address the "innovation chasm" between research 
results and socioeconomic outcomes' (the other three being human capital 
development, knowledge generation and exploitation via R&D, and 
knowledge infrastructure) (2007c:8). In addition, five 'grand challenges' are 
proposed, to exploit existing advantages, encourage multidisciplinary 
approaches, respond to existing questions and develop new products. 31 
Core projections for 2018 are outlined. Amongst these is the goal of 
substantially increasing patents and patent applications originating from 
South Africa, both at the South African patents office and in major patent 
offices internationally. 
The Innovation Fund, established almost a decade ago, is one of the main 
agencies responsible for the implementation of the R&D Strategy, and is 
31 The five grand challenges are: From Farmer to Pharma: life sciences and health; 
Expanding the limits of space science and technology; In search of energy security; 
Science and technology in response to global change; and Human and social dynamics. 
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likely to become the agency responsible for implementing and 
administering the legislation ultimately enacted in terms of the IPR 
Framework. It describes its mission as 'catalys[ing] technology innovation 
for the social and economic benefit of all South Africans', which it carries 
out by funding near-market and end-stage research for the production of 
new intellectual property and companies, the expansion of existing 
industrial sectors, and the promotion of South Africa's economic 
competitiveness. Its current structure includes a Research and 
Development Funding Unit, which provides R&D funding for approved 
projects in response to applications submitted to it, an Innovation Fund 
Commercialisation Office, which assists with the commercialisation of 
Innovation Fund projects (eg strategy development, due diligence, deal-
structuring), and the Intellectual Property Management Office, which 
administers funding instruments to promote the patenting of intellectual 
property by PROs, SMMEs and Techno-Entrepreneurs. 
Innovation Fund project support usually requires that any eventual 
commercial proceeds resulting from the funded project are shared by the 
recipient (typically a consortium) with the Innovation Fund. Further, 
Innovation Fund secures itself a right to take ownership of project 
intellectual property, together with the right to obtain a license for use of 
relevant background intellectual propertl2 held by the recipient, in the 
event that the recipient fails to commercialise the intellectual property 
within a stipulated time period (usually three to five years).33 The 
Innovation Fund's Intellectual Property Management Office is expected to 
take on the role of the agency proposed to be established under the IPR 
Framework and Draft Bill (acting as a national intellectual property office), 
as discussed in section 5.5. 
32 'Background intellectual property' refers to intellectual property owned by a grantee that 
f:re-dates the funded project, but is relevant to the project field. 
3 Certain other government agencies sometimes impose similar conditions eg the 
Biotechnology Innovation Centres (see Wolson, 2005). 
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5.5 The Intellectual Property Rights Framework and Draft Bill 
As shown in section 5.4 above, concrete efforts have been underway for a 
couple of years on the part of DST to give effect to the R&D Strategy's call 
for a clear approach to address the situation of inadequate protection and 
management of intellectual property from publicly financed research, via 
legislation. These efforts culminated in the Intellectual Property Rights 
From Publicly Financed Research Framework (IPR Framework) 
(Department of Science and Technology, 2005), which was drawn up and 
circulated for discussion by stakeholders at a serious of public 
consultations which took place around the country in 2006, to precede the 
drafting of legislation. A marginally revised Framework (Department of 
Science and Technology, 2006) was subsequently presented to and 
approved by Cabinet in 2007, together with a Draft Bill,34 which was in turn 
released for public comment.35 
The Draft Bill was not well-received by stakeholders. At the time of writing, 
DST had indicated that fairly substantial re-drafting might occur, in 
response to comments received. It is however not clear whether this will 
be at a substantive level (noting that many of the comments submitted in 
response to the IPR Framework were not taken into account in the drafting 
of the Draft Bill), or whether this will mainly address certain ambiguities, 
use of language, unclear definitions, and potential conflicts with other 
legislation which appear in the Draft Bill. The discussion which follows in 
this section attempts to focus on the higher level substantive issues and 
underlying principles, rather than on the finer drafting details. 
5.5. 1 Out/ine of the Framework content 
The first chapter of the Framework deals with contextual issues. The 
Framework asserts 'an urgent need for the creation of a proper framework 
and enabling legislation for the effective management of intellectual 
34 Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research Bill: Draft (Gazette 29950, 
Notice 719),8 June 2007. 
35 Expect where specified to the contrary, reference to the Framework is made in relation 
to the first 2005 Framework document. 
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property arising from publicly financed research' (page 8), in order to 
prevent leakage of such intellectual property overseas, to give government 
'walk-in' rights to utilise such intellectual property and to harmonise 
institutional approaches to the management of such intellectual property. It 
is underpinned by the belief that increased levels of patenting will lead to 
more effective exploitation of publicly financed research, by the private 
sector or, in certain cases, for public use. 
The scope of the Framework (and the future legislation to be based on it) 
(page 9): 
... is focused on and limited to Intellectual Property (ie patents, copyright, 
designs, plant breeders' rights and indigenous knowledge, etc) protecting 
inventions made through work financed by public research funding. It 
deals with issues of ownership, benefit sharing from licensing and use of 
the patents and accountabilities of different role-players in the system of 
innovation. 
In the second chapter, the Framework seeks to compare South Africa's 
patent performance against international norms. While it may be argued 
that the data is investigated on a fairly superficial basis, there is sufficient 
evidence provided to show that participation of South African organisations 
and inventors in the international patent system is not only low, but also 
somewhat static, having failed to show any significant increase in the last 
decade or SO.36 Reference is made to the relevant sections of the R&D 
Strategy in the third chapter and existing South African intellectual property 
legislation and treaties are listed in the fourth chapter. 
Some current interventions and practices in this arena are briefly 
mentioned in the fifth chapter. The steps taken by some PROs to 
implement intellectual property policies are acknowledged, while noting that 
these are not uniform amongst institutions, and the protracted negotiations 
which often accompany the setting up of inter-institutional collaborations 
36 Further evidence of this is provided in a more recent study undertaken by the Innovation 
Fund, entitled The State of Patenting in South Africa: Special Report 2007' (Innovation 
Fund, 2007). 
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are ascribed to this lack of a uniform approach to intellectual property 
issues. Interestingly, the Framework does not attempt to provide any 
assessment of current South African PRO technology transfer 
performance. 
While some motivation is provided for the establishment of legislation in the 
sixth chapter, on the basis that this is the route followed by most developed 
countries, and increasingly by emerging economies, other alternatives are 
not explicitly considered. 
The seventh chapter discusses the importance of the Framework for its 
various stakeholders. The Framework then concludes in the eighth chapter 
with some details of substance to be incorporated into the legislation. The 
key elements of these recommendations are identified and discussed in the 
sections which follow, and compared with the proposed legislative 
approach actually taken in the Draft Bill. 
5.5.2 Establishment of a new government agency 
According to the Framework, government will be responsible for 'provid[ing] 
incentives for the processes of creation, protection and use of patents 
arising from publicly financed research' (page 32). An agency will have to 
be designated to manage this policy, a function which the Framework 
proposes be taken on by the Innovation Fund, in order to take advantage of 
existing infrastructure. This agency will provide assistance to institutions in 
implementing the policy, promote good governance of intellectual property 
management in PROs, develop and maintain a database of PRO 
intellectual property management and technology transfer activity, offer 
financial support to institutions and individuals to incentivise patenting, and 
engage in capacity-building (sections 8.7.1 and 8.10). 
The Bill refers to the establishment of a National Intellectual Property 
Management Office (NIPMO), to be managed by an entity appointed by the 
Minister. NIPMO is to be given widespread functions, ranging from general 
administration of the legislation, to oversight of and support for the system 
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overall, to day-to-day intellectual property management (whether in 
conjunction with PROs or in respect of intellectual property owned by the 
State under the statutory provisions) (sections 7 and 8). It is anticipated 
that the Innovation Fund's Intellectual Property Management Office will 
become the 'NIPMO', located within the TIA structure. 
The Bill further provides for the establishment of a Patent Fund 
administered by NIPMO to provide financial support to PROs for obtaining 
statutory intellectual property protection on stipulated terms (section 16). 
5.5.3 Establishment and functions of TTOs within PROs 
The Framework states that PROs, as recipients of public research funding, 
will be obligated to seek patent protection for inventions developed from 
such funding, irrespective of the form that the funding takes. Institutions 
will therefore have to set up central TTOs, build capacity to manage 
obligations under the legislation and put in place a written intellectual 
property policy which meets minimum legislated standards. Provision is 
made for the national agency to step in to assist those institutions without 
their own technology transfer services (sections 8.1.1 and 8.7.2). Invention 
declarations will have to be registered with the national agency (section 
8.7.5). 
Revenues received as a result of successful exploitation of intellectual 
property developed from publicly financed research will accrue to the 
publicly financed institution concerned, and be used to support TTO and 
institutional R&D activities, as well as shared with inventors (section 8.7.4). 
A set of principles for the allocation of revenues is outlined, and originally a 
fixed formula was proposed, which would have required all PROs to share 
proceeds according to a stipulated ratio (ie 30% to the inventor, shared 
equally in the case of multiple inventors; 30% to the business/operational 
level of the institution for research stimulation and support; 30% to the 
executive level of the PRO for new research stimulation and support or 
additional support to the TTO); and 10% to the no to cover costs and 
allow for staff incentives (sections 8.1.3 and 8.11). The prescribed formula 
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was however only mentioned as an example in the final Framework 
document presented to Cabinet, which makes reference to empowering the 
Minister to enact Regulations (sections 8.1.3 and 8.11 respectively of the 
document presented to Cabinet). 
Nine public research institutes and 22 higher education institutions are 
listed as publicly financed institutions covered by the legislation in a 
Schedule to the Bill. Under the proposed legislation, these PROs will be 
given a period of six months from the Act taking effect to set up a no (or 
'IPMO' - ie Intellectual Property Management Office - according to the 
language of the Draft Bill), unless determined otherwise by the Minister in 
conjunction with any other Minister to whom the PRO might report (eg 
Minister of Education in respect of universities) (section 5). Specific 
qualifications and expertise required for IPMO staff are set out 
(interestingly, no analogous criteria are suggested for NIPMO officials) and 
IPMO functions are listed (section 6). The latter include the development 
of relevant policies, handling invention disclosures, filing applications for 
the protection of intellectual property, screening all publications for 
'potential intellectual property that through publication may lose protection' 
under the patent law, managing and sharing revenues generated from 
technology transfer activity, and interfacing with NIPMO. The relationship 
with NIPMO includes a requirement to report annually to NIPMO on 'all 
matters related to intellectual property at the Institution', and an obligation 
to refer any intellectual property to NIPMO in respect of which the TTO 
elects not to seek statutory protection within fourteen days of such decision 
(section 9). 
Under the Draft Bill, benefit-sharing of the proceeds of commercialisation 
with PROs and PRO inventors in their personal capacity will apply even 
where the intellectual property concerned is registered in the name of the 
State. (The Bill is silent on the question of whether the State itself will 
share in such revenues.) A minimum percentage set by the Minister in 
Regulations would accrue to inventors, while the institution would have 
discretion to distribute the remainder as it chooses, with the expectation 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
ROSEMARY A WOLSON MPHIL 
that a 'reasonable portion' be directed to the research unit responsible for 
the invention and to the TTO (section 11). 
5.5.4 Rights and duties of PRO employees 
According to the Framework, individuals who utilise public research funding 
would be under the obligation to declare to their employing institution any 
inventions developed in the course of their research, which inventions are 
assigned to their institution (sections 8.1.1, 8.7.6 and 8.9). All individual 
qualifying inventors whose intellectual property generates 'economic 
benefits' for their institution or 'a client of the institution' (page 33) stand to 
share in these benefits (sections 8.1.3 and 8.11). 
The Draft Bill stipulates that employees will be deemed to have assigned 
their intellectual property to their employing PRO (section 3), that they will 
be obligated to disclose inventions, discoveries and improvements within 
thirty days to their institution (section 10) and that inventors will be entitled 
to receive a 'minimum percentage' to be set by the Minister in Regulations 
(section 11). 
5.5.5 Co-funded research (including collaborative and sponsored 
research) 
According to the Framework, where the research leading to the generation 
of relevant intellectual property involves more than one party, a single 
partner will take the role of Designated IP Institution/Holder and be 
responsible for managing the intellectual property on behalf of all partners 
(sections 8.7.6 and 8.8). In cases 'where business institutions, or 
international groups participate in research with public funding' (page 38), 
the Designated IP Institution will have to be a South African PRO or the 
national agency, although special provisions will apply where such partners 
co-finance the research concerned. The Framework lists several principles 
relating to the co-financing of research, in an effort to assist in determining 
ownership of intellectual property developed in the course of such 
research. 
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The Draft Bill does not explicitly deal with the question of ownership of 
intellectual property where more than one PRO might be involved, but 
implies that joint ownership would not be prohibited, and does not appear 
to restrict PROs with a shared interest in any intellectual property from 
negotiating this issue between themselves. 
In respect of research funding from 'private entities and enterprises', the 
Bill distinguishes between 'project-specific' funding, and projects funded on 
a full-cost model on the one hand, and 'non specific', 'of a general nature or 
partially general nature' on the other. In the case of the former, the funder 
may acquire ownership of the project intellectual property, provided that the 
funding agreement allows for benefit-sharing of royalties derived from 
exploitation of the intellectual property concerned. In the case of the latter, 
the funder may be a co-owner of the relevant intellectual property where 
such company 'is best placed to manage and commercialise the intellectual 
property in the national interest, or there has been a significant contribution 
of resources, including background intellectual property' by the company 
concerned (section 21). 
5.5.6 Technology transfer 
The Framework recognises licensing as the most important mechanism for 
technology transfer from the university to industry (section 8.2). Start-up 
companies are regarded as vehicles for commercialisation of technology 
where 'there is no immediate licensee in view' (page 33), and licensing of 
intellectual property is considered preferable to assignment. The 
Framework expresses a preference for non-exclusive licensing in order to 
ensure wider availability, but acknowledges that in some cases, where 
substantial further development is required to take a technology to market, 
exclusivity may be permitted, with the prerequisite that performance 
clauses are in place (section 8.3). The Framework calls for institutions to 
make 'reasonable and demonstrable' (page 34) efforts to license 
technology within South Africa, on the basis that this will maximise the 
impact on local economic development and create commercialisation 
opportunities for South African industry. Where local licensees cannot be 
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found, institutions will be obligated to ensure that other benefits accrue to 
local business (eg manufacturing rights, preferential pricing, support for 
R&D) (section 8.4). The Framework proposes that SMMEs and Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) enterprises should benefit 
preferentially from opportunities to exploit intellectual property from publicly 
financed research, and that nos will have to demonstrate that they have 
made efforts to facilitate this, and report accordingly (section 8.5). It is 
stated that international licensing will be permitted 'when licensing is not 
possible in South Africa' (page 35), in order to increase foreign direct 
investment and technology partnerships for the country, provided this 
would not be in conflict with international treaty obligations or national 
security (section 8.6). 
The Draft Bill sets out in detail conditions to govern the exploitation of 
publicly financed intellectual property. PROs are required to determine 
license terms in consultation with NIPMO (section 12), which has the effect 
of introducing NIPMO as an additional participant at the negotiating table, 
even when NIPMO is not a party to the contract. Non-exclusive licenses 
are preferred. Exclusive licenses may be granted only if the licensee is 
able to prove that (a) it will not be economically feasible to exploit the 
licensed technology non-exclusively and (b) there is 'no overriding State 
interest that militates against granting of an exclusive license'. The 
duration of exclusive licenses is limited to five years, after which the PRO 
licensor and NIPMO are required to reassess 'the need' for exclusivity. 
'Where feasible', exclusive licensees are required to 'manufacture, process 
and otherwise utilise' the licensed invention in South Africa. NIPMO is 
given the power to suspend and/or revoke licenses in the case of a 
licensee's failure to comply with these and other conditions, including 
failure to 'exploit or fully exploit' a license 'to the benefit' of South African 
citizens, if not satisfied with reasons provided for such failure (section 12). 
PROs are required to give preference to BBBEE companies and SMMEs 
as licensees (section 13). NIPMO must be informed of any intention to 
'dispose of' (ie assign ownership rights rather than license) intellectual 
property and 'the benefits that will accrue to the State' as a result of such 
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disposal must be provided. NIPMO must also be informed of any intention 
to license or dispose of intellectual property off-shore, which may only take 
place 'when South Africa does not have capacity to develop or exploit the 
Intellectual Property', and subject to Reserve Bank Exchange Control 
regulations and approvals. The PRO licensor bears the onus of proving 
the lack of capacity nationally and will have to ensure that benefits 'accrue 
to South Africa' from the relevant transaction. Commercial exploitation of 
intellectual property must further be 'in accordance with the existing 
economic policies of the government' (section 15). 
5.5.7 Government walk-in rights 
According to the Framework, government will be given specified 'walk-in' or 
'step-in' rights to be able to use inventions derived from publicly financed 
research in times of 'national emergency and similar times of great national 
need' (page 36, section 8.7.3). 
Under the Draft Bill, these so-called 'walk-in' rights would entail the 
forfeiture of patent rights to the State and/or the revocation of an exclusive 
license, where the invention which is the subject of such patent and/or 
license were not being adequately exploited or utilised without satisfactory 
reason being shown (section 18). Any Minister of State also has the right 
to call for a particular patent to be assigned or exclusively licensed to the 
State where acquisition of the invention concerned is 'necessary for the 
Republic's health, security and other needs in the opinion of the Minister of 
State' (section 19). The Minister may revoke a license agreement or 
intellectual property assignment from a PRO to a company should the 
licensee/assignee fail to comply with the statutory conditions incorporated 
into the license or intellectual property assignment (section 20). 
5.5.8 Establishment of a patent fund 
The Framework notes that a dedicated fund to cover the costs of securing 
patent protection 'when this is in the national interest' should be 
established under a dedicated agency (page 19), and further mentions a 
new role taken on by Innovation Fund, to provide financial incentives for 
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high quality PRO-owned patents, and co-finance for PRO patents (page 
26). 
The Draft Bill proposes the establishment of a Patent Fund to be managed 
by NIPMO, incorporating the Innovation Fund's existing Patent Support 
Fund, to cover the costs of NIPMO and State-owned patents (section 16), 
and cost recovery for PRO patents according to terms set down by NIPMO 
(section 17). 
5.5.9 Regulations 
It is proposed in the Framework that the legislation to be drafted will set out 
key principles based on good international practice and aligned with the 
Framework, and will empower the Minister of Science and Technology to 
make regulations for implementation of the principles enshrined in the 
statute, to allow for greater flexibility (section 8.12). 
The Draft Bill empowers the Minister to make regulations which s/he 
deems necessary to ensure the proper implementation of the legislation 
(section 23). 
5.6 Other Key Relevant Policy and Regulatory Factors 
While a comprehensive discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, a 
snapshot of selected intersecting policy and regulatory issues is presented, 
in order to provide a broader context for the subsequent critique of the 
potential impact of the IPR Framework in Chapter 6. 
5.6. 1 Relevant Department of Education policies 
Since the Department of Education (DoE) plays a prominent role in shaping 
a variety of policies and practices in the university environment, including 
those related to research, its failure to promote university-industry linkages 
actively or explicitly, as observed by Kraak (2007) is conspicuous. More 
specifically, the DoE has been largely silent on the question of technology 
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transfer, and some of its policies could even be viewed as discouraging 
technology transfer activity. As an example, the distribution of subsidy to 
universities made by DoE according to a complex formula is an important 
driver of behaviour. While peer-reviewed publications are an important 
parameter of the formula calculations, patents and other outputs relating to 
the successful deployment of university research results in society are not 
considered in the research subsidy formula. Publications therefore tend to 
carry greater weight in university reward systems, which typically fail to 
provide suitable incentives to encourage patenting and technology transfer. 
Consequently, this remains a marginal activity. 
The restructuring of the national higher education system undertaken by 
the DoE has seen 36 higher education institutions reduced to 22 as a result 
of a series of mergers aimed at addressing the fragmentation and 
inefficiencies of the apartheid-era system, in an effort create non-racial 
universities, achieve economies of scale and scope, and streamline 
structures (see Council on Higher Education, 2000). However, it can be 
argued that as the transformation process continues, research and 
research management capacity and institutional culture, both historical and 
of the newly-created institutions born of the merger process, will influence 
the prospects for different universities to engage effectively in technology 
transfer activities. Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that five of the 
universities account for a significant proportion of both research 
expenditure and outputs (Kraak, 2007; Kruss, 2005), while a handful of 
others have some research and innovation capacity, at least in certain 
areas, or are attempting to build such capacity. But the substantially lower 
R&D budgets at the majority of South African universities cannot but lead 
to lower research outputs, including that subset of the total which offers 
potential for technology transfer. 
5.6.2 National intellectual property regime 
South Africa has for many years had relatively strong intellectual property 
legislation, closely based on British law (and more recently, the European 
Patent Convention), and substantially compliant with the Agreement on 
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Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).37 While the 
national patents office, the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Registration Office (CIPRO) is a non-examining registration office, with 
very limited capacity, the courts have traditionally tended to uphold the 
rights of intellectual property holders. As a consequence, South Africa is 
for the most part viewed as a country which respects intellectual property 
rights. There are however indications that the government may begin to 
explore more creative policy options (as it has already done on the 
question of access to medicines),38 as awareness increases of the impact 
of intellectual property on development and domestic innovation (eg WTO 
Doha Declaration, the Development Agenda tabled at the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation). Some constraints exist because of obligations 
under various multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, but in more 
recent negotiations, South African negotiators appear to be taking a 
stronger stance than in the past against intellectual property demands 
which are not deemed to be in the country's best interests. 
While intellectual property policy, legislation and administration (through 
CIPRO), as well as international trade, are DTI competencies, DTI does not 
appear to have made much input into the IPR Framework and Draft Bill. 
There is certainly no evidence of DTI's trend towards a more 'pro-
development' intellectual property policy position captured in the 
Framework. 
37 TRIPS is a 1995 World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement which sets out minimum 
standards of intellectual property protection to be adopted by all WTO member states. The 
South African intellectual property legislative framework pre-dates TRIPS and only 
relatively minor changes were needed to bring South African law substantially into 
compliance with TRIPS. 
38 A 2001 legislative amendment aimed at permitting parallel importation of patented drugs 
received world attention when it led to 39 international pharmaceutical companies 
instituting legal proceedings against the South African government, claiming that the move 
violated South Africa's obligations under TRIPS. The lawsuit was ultimately dropped after 
international condemnation of the companies' position, which was seen to be obstructing 
the availability of cheaper antiretrovirals (ARVs) for a country with one of the highest 
incidences of HIV/AIDS infection in the world. Several pharmaceutical companies have 
subsequently entered into voluntary licensing agreements with South African 
manufacturers for ARVs. 
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As dealt with in the IPR Framework in some detail, and confirmed in a 
recent study undertaken by the Innovation Fund (2007), patenting activity 
by South African organisations is weak. Apart from one or two 
exceptions,39 South African PROs exhibit a particularly low tendency to 
patent their research findings (Lubango and Pouris, 2007). 
5.6.3 Exploitation of biodiversity and indigenous knowledge 
South Africa is considered a 'megadiverse' country as a result of the wealth 
of unique plant biodiversity found in the country, and is in fact the only 
country in the world which contains an entire floral kingdom (the Cape 
Floral Kingdom) within its borders (Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism, 2005). Efforts to realise value from this biodiversity through 
bioprospecting are therefore receiving attention and several PROs are 
engaging in research based on indigenous biological material. In many 
cases, this is enhanced by access to indigenous knowledge associated 
with applications of the biological resources concerned. This avenue of 
research offers enormous potential particularly in the field of drug 
development and has been highlighted as a priority area through inclusion 
in one of the grand challenges outlined in the DST Ten-Year Innovation 
Plan, 'From Farmer to Pharma' (Department of Science and Technology, 
2007c). 
In line with the need to fulfil international treaty obligations and follow 
ethical practices, South Africa has recently introduced legislative and policy 
instruments to recognise and protect biodiversity and indigenous 
knowledge, which impact upon the management and performance of the 
research, as well as on the prospects for ultimately generating exploitable 
outputs. The Biodiversity Act,40 which falls under the auspices of the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, creates a framework for 
bioprospecting, which requires anyone wishing to carry out bioprospecting 
activities to enter into appropriate MTAs and/or benefit-sharing agreements 
39 Notable in this regard is the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, which for 
several years has conSistently featured as one of the most active South African patenting 
organisations. 
40 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, Act No 10 of 2004. 
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with stakeholders who provide access to indigenous biological material 
and/or knowledge associated with such resources, which will be used in 
the bioprospecting work. 
Regulations relating to bioprospecting, access and benefit-sharing are 
pending under the Biodiversity Act, to operationalise the statutory 
framework. Draft Regulations released in 200741 propose a permitting 
system for research and bioprospecting on and export of indigenous 
biological resources, and stipulate the contents of, and criteria and 
requirements for benefit-sharing agreements and MTAs, which are 
mandated under the Act where researchers gain access to knowledge 
and/or materials from other stakeholders, such as indigenous communities. 
The draft Regulations have been through a process of public consultation 
and comment and amended Regulations are now awaited. 
While there is broad support for the objectives of the legislation, some 
concern exists regarding the feasibility of effective implementation and 
inadvertent consequences which may arise. Broad definitions mean that 
the Regulations would apply very widely in respect of research on 
indigenous biological material, even at a very early stage. Moreover, 
requirements for export permits might limit the types of research 
collaborations South African organisations can enter into with foreign 
partners (even though such collaborations are considered essential for the 
success of the DST proposed Farmer to Pharma grand challenge). 
Considerable administrative expertise is called for in order to implement the 
draft Regulations effectively and there are fears that bureaucratic delays 
could lead to loss of patenting opportunities, pose a risk to biodiversity and 
jeopardise research funding or collaboration opportunities. There are also 
concerns about possible retrospective effect, which could affect existing 
contractual obligations. 
41 Regulations on Bio-Prospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing, Notice 329 of 2007, 
Government Gazette, No 29711, 16 March 2007. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
THE EVOL VING POLICY LANDSCAPE FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM PRO'S IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Further regulatory developments regarding the use of indigenous 
knowledge are anticipated as implementation progresses on DST's 2004 
Indigenous Knowledge Systems Policy (Department of Science and 
Technology, 2004), which might include the creation of new sui generis 
rights to protect indigenous knowledge.42 The regulatory framework which 
is eventually put in place will determine the extent to which benefits can be 
effectively harnessed. 
5.6.4 Exchange control regulations 
South African Exchange Control Regulations place restrictions on the 
export of capital, by requiring Treasury permission in advance for 'any 
transaction whereby capital or any right to capital is directly or indirectly 
exported' from the country. Case law has determined that patents and the 
right to benefit from royalties fall within the statutory definition of 'capital'. 
This means that South African patent holders may not assign or license 
their patents to foreign entities without obtaining the necessary exchange 
control approval. This requirement therefore imposes a significant 
limitation on partnering with foreign companies. While not necessarily 
insurmountable, the additional transaction costs incurred (including delays 
in being able to finalise agreements) are a disincentive to such deals. 
5.6.5 Concluding remarks 
The policy issues highlighted in section 5.6 illustrate some of the areas of 
potential misalignment with the proposed IPR Framework. Furthermore, it 
is acknowledged here that a host of other policy initiatives exist which are 
also likely to impact on the ultimate success of the Framework, although it 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation to cover these comprehensively. 
These include several DTI offerings relating to BBBEE, small business 
development and support, and technology and innovation; new tax 
incentives for R&D; as well as initiatives at the level of provincial and local 
42 One relevant development in this regard was brought about by a Patents Amendment 
Act (Act No 20 of 2005) to the Patents Act (Act No 57 of 1978). The recently implemented 
provisions introduce a 'disclosure of origin' requirement, in terms of which patent 
applicants must disclose 'information relating to any role played by an indigenous 
biological resource, a genetiC resource or traditional knowledge or use in an invention'. 
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government. This section therefore serves to sound a cautionary note to 
policymakers, by emphasising the importance of a holistic approach. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CRITIQUE, RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a critique of the IPR Framework and Draft Bill, 
divided into three sections. The first part will examine whether or not 
legislation is an appropriate, necessary and/or desirable instrument for 
achieving the objectives of the IPR Framework. The second section will 
assess some of the specific provisions and their potential impact against 
the Framework goals, as well as point out provisions which ought to have a 
place in such a policy framework. The third part will speculate on some of 
the general consequences which might ensue if the Draft Bill were enacted 
into law. This analysis will draw on the earlier discussion on lessons 
learned from technology transfer studies and from other countries, and on 
the prevailing South African policy environment and technology transfer 
practices and experience. 
The second part of the chapter attempts to draw together the general 
discussion on technology transfer, the comparative review of policy 
approaches adopted by different countries, and the prevailing conditions 
which characterise the South African environment, in order to develop a set 
of tentative policy recommendations. These are designed, from the 
perspective of both an academic and a practitioner, with the intention of 
offering some realistic and practical alternatives and enhancements to the 
current framework, better informed by evidence and thus more firmly 
grounded. It is suggested that these proposals might be applied more 
broadly than in this dissertation alone. In addition to providing insights to 
guide and inform policymakers, they might also serve to enrich the public 
debate and assist in increasing legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders, 
ultimately improving the prospects for a successful policy intervention. 
Finally, a concluding discussion completes the dissertation. 
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6.2 Critique of the IPR Framework and Draft Bill 
6.2. 1 Is legislation the right option? 
In calling for an intervention to improve management of intellectual property 
from publicly financed research, the R&D Strategy presupposes the need 
for legislation to bring this about, without a rationale to support this view. 
The IPR Framework attempts to motivate (although with little supporting 
evidence) for the need for legislation on the basis that this has been the 
preferred route for most other countries. However, as the discussion in 
Chapter 4 shows, (and which is in fact explicitly acknowledged in the 
Framework), the main objectives of such legislation have been quite 
different from one country to another. For example: 
• In the USA, 8ayh-Dole was enacted in order to shift ownership of 
intellectual property from the federal government to grantees, and 
permit exclusive licensing to industry, in order to incentivise technology 
transfer. 
• In Denmark, legislation conferred ownership of intellectual property on 
PROs, where in the past this was owned by individual researchers. 
• French legislation was aimed at improving weak relationships between 
PROs and industry, and at encouraging the establishment of start-ups 
based on PRO intellectual property. 
• Italy took an approach which bucked the trend of PRO ownership, by 
moving away from this to a position in which inventors are permitted to 
own intellectual property. 
The case of Canada was also discussed, where legislation was eschewed 
in favour of a voluntary approach, supplemented with a targeted policy for 
one category of funding, aimed at changing ownership of intellectual 
property from federal government to contractors, and achieving 
consistency across government departments. 
Since in South Africa, for the most part ownership vests in grantee 
organisations rather than government funding agencies, and at present 
there are no restrictions on exclusive licensing, some of the main 
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objectives of Bayh-Dole do not apply. Most South African PROs own 
intellectual property developed by their employees in the course and scope 
of their employment, rendering the Danish approach unsuitable as a 
precedent. It is unlikely that South Africa would consider the Italian 
approach of individual inventor ownership, in light of overwhelming 
movement in the opposite direction in most policy approaches (OECD, 
2003). Of the examples supplied here, some of the objectives of the 
French legislation appear similar to our own, yet the content and focus of 
the Draft Bill are significantly different. The Canadian decision to allow a 
laissez-faire system to continue for the most part also merits further 
i nvestigatio n. 
It is instructive to take heed of the recommendation of the UK Lambert 
Review of Business-University Collaboration (Crown Copyright, 2003) that 
the UK not adopt Bayh-Dole-type legislation, because of the different 
prevailing conditions in the UK at that time. While lack of clarity with 
respect to ownership of intellectual property in collaborations between 
universities and industry was identified as a constraint, the need to allow 
for flexibility in such relationships was deemed to be more important, and 
the view was expressed that the introduction of similar legislation 'would 
present greater risks to existing collaborations than it would bring benefits 
by improving clarity in negotiations for new projects' (2003:53). Instead, it 
was proposed that a protocol be developed as a starting point for 
negotiations between universities and industry. A further recommendation 
suggested that model contracts be developed in order to assist the 
negotiation process. These were envisaged to cater for different types of 
relationship, and would be adopted voluntarily by the parties to govern 
collaborations. The recent Sainsbury Review reports that a series of model 
agreements have since been drawn up to govern intellectual property 
issues for different scenarios of collaborative and contract research, and 
have been adopted by a number of organisations, while a further set of 
model contracts for research consortia is under development (Crown 
Copyright, 2007). 
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While the IPR Framework specifically cites the OEeD Turning Science into 
Business report (OEeD, 2003) in its motivation for a statutory approach, 
the OEeD report actually emphasises that legislation is not the only means 
for stimulating intellectual property protection and commercialisation by 
PROs, and highlights the value of the use of alternative instruments, such 
as codes of practice or guidelines (2003:102). The report also comments 
on the fact that legislation alone is not sufficient to promote successful 
technology transfer, noting that a change of mindset and culture is often 
necessary and must be achieved through other interventions (2003:103). 
The South African policy documents contain no evidence of any 
consideration having been given to alternative, non-legislated approaches, 
such as the use of policy instruments, guidelines and/or contractual 
arrangements. Interestingly, though, there are examples of such 
approaches being implemented in practice. For example, research funding 
agreements emanating from DST and some DST agencies now in fact 
incorporate provisions giving effect to many of the principles articulated in 
the IPR Framework. This would seem to provide at least a prima facie 
indication that alternatives to legislation could play an effective role in 
encouraging desirable practices. 
The Framework (page 31) acknowledges that effective interaction between 
all stakeholders will be critical in order to obtain the benefits expected to 
stem from the proposed legislation. It is stated that there will be a need for: 
... a level playing field, clear minimum requirements and a balance of 
incentives and regulations to ensure that this is achieved. International 
best practice suggests that simplicity, clarity and transparency greatly 
enhance the success of policy frameworks. Over-elaboration, overly 
prescriptive requirements and a dominance of regulation over incentives, 
will limit our ability to capture value for our nation. 
While these are laudatory observations, they do not however seem to have 
been adequately captured in drawing up the Draft Bill, which has a strong 
prescriptive flavour. Moreover, stakeholder involvement has been limited 
to commenting on documents (whether in person or in writing) in a 'one-
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way' process. The importance of stakeholder participation is illustrated by 
the Canadian, Danish and French experiences (noting in particular that the 
Danish process was almost derailed, and the policy scope subsequently 
scaled down, due to insufficient consultation initially). This is further 
reinforced by the OECD report, which notes the value of a consultation 
procedure early in the process to find an appropriate balance between the 
various interests of different players (2003:103). 
Turning to the literature, cautionary statements from scholars about 
difficulties associated with emulating legislation such as the 8ayh-Dole Act 
in a different context bear further investigation. Mowery and Sampat 
(2005:232) point out that such emulation may in fact be counterproductive 
if it fails to recognise alternative channels for technology transfer and 
exploitation: 
Inasmuch as patenting and licensing are rated by industrial R&D 
managers as relatively unimportant for technology transfer in most fields, 
emulation of the 8ayh-Dole Act is insufficient and perhaps even 
unnecessary to stimulate higher levels of university-industry interaction 
and technology transfer. Instead, reforms to enhance interinstitutional 
competition and autonomy within national university systems, as well as 
support for the external institutional contributors to new-firm formation and 
technology commercialization, appear to be more important. 
Focusing specifically on developing countries, Sobolski et al (2005) 
suggest that the substantial investment required to support technology 
transfer activity could perhaps have a greater impact on building technical 
know-how and scientific expertise if spent on education and improving 
interactions between the public and private sectors, and that undue 
emphasis on licensing as a vehicle for technology transfer and fostering 
economic growth may yield disappointing results. 
Finally, we would do well to remember the legislative history leading up to 
the promulgation of 8ayh-Dole. It was preceded by intensive debate over 
several years (dating back to the Kennedy administration in 1963), and 
several early drafts, which allowed various issues of concern to different 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ROSEMARY A WOLSON MPHIL 
stakeholders to be raised and at least some of these taken into account in 
the final version of the act. Similarly in Denmark, the statute initially 
proposed had to be re-drafted in response to strong objections from a wide 
range of stakeholders. 
6.2.2 Critique of key proposals contained in the Draft Bill 
Irrespective of whether legislation or other policy instruments are ultimately 
invoked, the IPR Framework and Draft Bill convey information about the 
types of behaviour that DST is attempting to establish in and by PROs. It is 
therefore instructive to evaluate some of the main proposals in order to 
determine their potential impact. 
Many of the concerns elaborated on here centre on the highly prescriptive 
nature of the Draft Bill on the one hand, and the strongly interventionist, 
'gatekeeper' role proposed for government on the other, which when taken 
together could serve as a strong disincentive to PROs, researchers and 
private sector investors to engage in technology transfer. It is somewhat 
encouraging to note that these could potentially be easily remedied through 
the adoption of a more consensual process, with the necessary political 
will. Other criticisms concern elements that have been omitted, the 
absence of which could perhaps (although not necessarily) be an indication 
that insufficient consideration has been given to certain important factors. 
6.2.2.1 Institutional internal policy-making authority circumscribed 
The Draft Bill severely restricts institutional autonomy of PROs in a number 
of spheres. Opportunities are circumscribed for different types of PROs to 
craft institutional policies and structures which are tailored to their particular 
situations. It can be motivated that where PROs already have policies and 
procedures in place which are broadly compliant with the underlying 
principles of the legislation, requiring changes to these policies to comply 
with specific details set out in the legislation can lead to inequitable 
situations, where employees are treated differently depending on whether 
they developed intellectual property before or after the legislation takes 
effect. Unnecessary administrative costs will also be entailed. 
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Of the South African PROs with TTOs, it is observed that most if not all are 
attempting to conduct their intellectual property management and 
commercialisation activities in line with the broad principles expressed in 
the Framework, although probably not in full compliance with the detailed 
provisions. The question is therefore whether compliance to the prescribed 
requirements will improve their technology transfer performance. 
Those PROs without nos are for the most part institutions with a small 
research base. The question for them, it can be argued, is whether setting 
up TTOs and instituting relevant policies, as required by the legislation, will 
be likely to yield sufficient technology transfer opportunities to make the 
efforts worthwhile, and to make a meaningful contribution to the national 
system. 
It is submitted that insufficient evidence is available to provide positive 
answers to either question. In respect of the first situation, obliging TTOs 
to put changes to internal policies and procedures of little substantive effect 
through institutional structures is likely to be a bureaucratic process which 
distracts no staff, already spread thin, from their technology transfer 
activities. In respect of the second, it would seem that the costs of 
implementation of the proposed interventions must be quantified against 
the potential benefits to be achieved. This will require an examination of 
the nature and size of the research endeavour at relevant PROs. 
Arguably, such institutions would be better served if they could choose to 
set up structures tailored according to their specific needs, which might be 
'lighter' than those proposed under the draft legislation. Such nos could 
then potentially grow as capacity is built and the need for their services 
increases. It is noted that the Draft Bill makes allowance for the relevant 
Minister to issue exemptions to the requirement to set up a no, but there 
does not appear to be scope for PROs to implement the stipulated 
functions in a partial fashion. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ROSEMARY A WOLSON MPHIL 
The provision in the Draft Bill which requires TTOs to screen all 
publications for novelty-destroying data which would preclude patenting if 
published prior to filing a patent application is likely to face significant 
opposition from many university researchers, who will view this as a 
restriction on their academic freedom. Because of very strong views of 
academics in this regard in Canada, both the Expert Panel Report (ACST, 
1999) and subsequent proposals (Riddle, 2004) stressed that the right of 
an individual researcher to make this decision should not be tampered with. 
Prohibiting publication of information that a researcher wants to put into the 
public domain and expressly does not wish to patent is likely to produce a 
backlash, at least in those PROs which have traditionally allowed 
researchers a high degree of independence in this regard. Good practice 
would dictate that a process should be in place within institutions to avoid 
inadvertent publication of patentable subject matter. However, it is not 
obvious that review by the TTO is an optimal or even feasible way of 
achieving this - this depends amongst other things on the extent of the 
PRO's publishing activity and the capacity of the TTO. It would be 
desirable for PROs to be able to determine the most appropriate manner of 
dealing with this issue, in alignment with institutional culture and other 
policies and structures. TTO educational programmes should raise 
awareness amongst researchers. The TTO could in any event be available 
to provide advice on request. 
6.2.2.2 Institutional authority to contract with external parties 
constrained 
Little flexibility will be permitted to PROs in structuring intellectual property 
terms of sponsored research and research collaboration agreements, 
which is likely to deter at least some potential funders and collaborators. 
Foreign entities might resist compulsory terms which could differ from or 
even conflict with their own national laws or policies, while South African 
companies might find it easier to partner with research organisations 
overseas, if fewer restrictions apply. Because the industry share of 
research funding at PROs is significantly higher than in many other 
countries (OECD, 2007), and because of the growing importance of 
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international R&D collaborations, any substantial withdrawal of these 
sources of support and partnership would have an adverse effect not only 
on institutional capacity to undertake technology transfer, but also on the 
quality and quantity of the overall institutional research enterprise. As the 
OECD report cautions (2003:105): 'IP [intellectual property] policies and IP 
management should reduce rather than increase transaction costs and so 
increase the scope for international co-operation in S&T [science and 
technology] and innovation.' This is ignored at our peril. The Danish 
experience, which saw a decrease in university-industry collaborations in 
certain sectors after the introduction of similar legislation (despite no legal 
bars on the universities' freedom to assign rights to industry if they chose to 
do so), with Danish researchers replaced by foreign researchers, also 
sounds a cautionary note (Valentin and Jensen, 2007). Statements that 
the intellectual property ownership restrictions imposed by Bayh-Dole have 
made it more attractive for US companies to collaborate with overseas 
companies tell a similar story (Butts, 2007). 
Finally, it can be noted that while the Draft Bill confers some authority on 
South African PROs to make patenting decisions, NIPMO has a say in 
licensing decisions, again inhibiting PROs' freedom to contract. 
6.2.2.3 Role of NIPMO 
The functions proposed to be carried out by NIPMO are overly broad. 
Technology transfer skills and experience in South Africa, while growing, 
remain limited. NIPMO will have to be very well-staffed in order to play its 
envisaged role effectively. The requirement that NIPMO be an active 
participant in the commercialisation process for all intellectual property 
covered by the Bill is likely at the least to delay the process, and in many 
cases, could result in obstructing it altogether. A real risk exists that 
NIPMO, rather than providing an enabling influence on the technology 
transfer process, may instead introduce an additional layer of bureaucracy 
and potentially impede technology transfer. It is not obvious that NIPMO 
will have better capacity than a no in this regard, especially since the 
Draft Bill prescribes certain qualifications for PRO no staff, but not for 
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NIPMO staff. By insisting that both PROs and government must be 
involved in all licensing decisions, the efficiency of the process is likely to 
be eroded, and in the event of disagreement between them, prospective 
licensing deals might not materialise at all. It is therefore preferable that 
one party be empowered to make licensing decisions, which should 
logically be the party owning the intellectual property (ie the PRO, where it 
has elected to take title of such intellectual property). 
6.2.2.4 Vagueness of exercise of powers by the Minister 
The authority conferred on the Minister to revoke intellectual property 
assignments and licenses under certain circumstances creates an 
environment of uncertainty, thereby increasing risks for contracting parties 
entering into transactions covered by the legislation. 
6.2.2.5 Restricted commercialisation terms 
The Draft Bill prescribes several very detailed requirements to govern 
commercialisation and technology transfer (as discussed in section 5.5.6). 
However, these requirements are not necessarily appropriate to all 
technologies and all deals. In some cases, meeting these requirements will 
just not be feasible. It can be argued that it is necessary to permit sufficient 
flexibility to enable parties to adapt to the circumstances of a particular 
case. The Draft Bill seems to rest on the assumption that technology 
transfer is a simple, linear process which follows a single trajectory towards 
a single 'best possible outcome'. However, experience shows that this is 
often not the case. Different areas of technology and application in 
different industry sectors can call for very different routes to market, some 
of which will inevitably be closed off if the Draft Bill proposals prevail. 
Completing a deal can be a complex, time-consuming, painstaking 
endeavour, which involves balancing a slew of interests. 
The Draft Bill seeks to ensure that the broader public interest is considered, 
in addition to the interests of the contracting parties (typically a PRO 
licensor and firm licensee). It does so by introducing concepts such as the 
'national interest' and 'the benefit of the citizens of the Republic of South 
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Africa', but fails to define these terms, which are potentially subject to 
different interpretations and may in fact encompass within them a range of 
interests, some of which may even compete with one another. For 
example, are the interests of South African citizens better advanced by a 
PRO licensing an invention to a multinational company with a 
manufacturing track record and established distribution networks, capable 
of ensuring that a technology which improves quality of life reaches a wide 
market and generates substantial tax revenue for the fiscus, or by creating 
a new BBBEE SMME, which might create a handful of new jobs, but whose 
chances of penetrating the market are somewhat unpredictable? There 
would appear to be benefits to allowing individual cases to be evaluated on 
their merits. 
While the importance is acknowledged of taking advantage of every 
available opportunity to grow South African high-tech industry, the strict 
limitations on licensing to overseas companies can be questioned, when 
taking account of the small size of the local market, few companies waiting 
in the wings and expressing interest as prospective licensees of PRO 
technologies, and the difficulty of attracting venture capital to set up spin-
out companies or facilitate the expansion of existing companies. 
In reality, it is difficult (and frequently futile) to attempt to quantify future 
benefits upfront, as well as to assess accurately after the fact what benefits 
may have been generated had an alternative route been followed, in an 
effort to predict which deal would be 'the best' (Colyvas et aI, 2002). 
Bearing in mind the difficult landscape and limited opportunities for 
technology transfer which prevail in South Africa, setting the bar for 
permissible transactions too high and requiring too wide a range of criteria 
to be met, is likely to be counterproductive. 
Particular motivation may be offered for the five year initial term limit on 
exclusive licenses to be reconsidered. The amount of time that a licensee 
will require to develop an early stage PRO technology to the point of 
market readiness, and to recoup its investment once a product is 
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commercialised, will vary considerably, depending amongst other things on 
the nature of the technology, the stage of development when it is licensed 
and the costs of further R&D carried out by the licensee. This provision 
could therefore deter a company from licensing embryonic PRO inventions 
which require substantial further R&D and investment. It is worth noting 
that one of the few amendments which has been made to Bayh-Dole since 
it came into force was the scrapping of term limits on exclusive licenses 
(Council On Governmental Relations, 1999). 
6.2.2.6 Harmonisation of government agencies' approach to 
intellectual property 
The IPR Framework expressed the intention to harmonise the diverse 
approaches to intellectual property issues adopted by public financing 
instruments and funding agencies. Such harmonisation would be expected 
to bring benefits. The uniform situation in respect of title to intellectual 
property created by Bayh-Dole in relation to US federal funding agencies is 
acknowledged as one of the greatest strengths of Bayh-Dole (Council On 
Governmental Relations, 1999; Passman et ai, 2005). However, the 
proposed provisions of the Draft Bill will not necessarily achieve the same 
effect in South Africa, unless this issue is further addressed in regulations. 
Some of the institutions listed as PROs in the Schedule to the Draft Bill 
actually function as funding agencies, at least some of the time. However, 
those institutions would qualify as PROs when funding research at a PRO, 
even when not performing any of the funded research, and would thereby 
stand to own the intellectual property arising out of the relevant project if 
the funding agreement provided for this. The incentive to the PRO carrying 
out the research of owning the intellectual property developed by its 
researchers on public funding would thus potentially fall away. The PRO 
and funding organisation could potentially enter into negotiations to share 
the intellectual property concerned, but this would entail transaction costs, 
including the likelihood of delays, and thereby quite possibly defeat the 
purpose of harmonisation by requiring individualised solutions to be 
negotiated. 
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6.2.2.7 Walk-in rights and protection of the public interest 
The Draft Bill's efforts to deploy publicly financed intellectual property, on 
the one hand to promote industrial development, and on the other to 
achieve social benefits, create an implicit tension. Any policy intervention 
in this area must of course attempt to strike a balance in this regard, and it 
is acknowledged that it is no easy feat to do so. The current proposals, 
however, raise some questions. For one thing, no guidance is provided for 
weighing up the competing objectives, and the risk is run that neither 
objective will be attained. One way of framing the question may be to ask 
whether the primary aim of the policy is to promote entrepreneurship and 
economic development (which will require government's rights to be of 
more limited scope in order not to deter private sector investors or 
licensees), or to ensure social benefits (in which case a stronger, more 
proactive role for government is appropriate)? 
Furthermore, although the Bayh-Dole march-in rights were the inspiration 
for the 'walk-in' rights contained in the Draft Bill, it must be noted that these 
have never been exercised by the US government or any of its agencies. 
While some might argue that this renders the provision toothless, others 
believe that its existence effectively deters licensees from the behaviours 
(or omissions) that could trigger marching in. Some in fact attribute much 
of Bayh-Dole's success to the restraint exercised by the US government in 
this regard, as it has provided licensees with some degree of certainty that 
their rights in their licensed technology will not be unduly or arbitrarily 
affected. 
Nonetheless, the US march-in rights remain contentious, and it can be 
questioned whether a provision which has been in force for almost thirty 
years, yet never used, is an appropriate precedent for South Africa. Bar-
Shalom and Cook-Deegan (2002), in a case study involving an 
unsuccessful march-in petition to the NIH, refer to an analysis by an NIH 
official of inherent difficulties in the march-in provision. One of the main 
problems identified is that it forces research agencies to make business 
judgements they might not be qualified to make. Most march-in petitions 
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which have been attempted have been in connection with the pricing of 
drugs. In rejecting march-in requests, agencies such as NIH have relied 
amongst other things on legislative history referring back to the intention of 
the drafters of the statute, and determined that consideration of pricing 
issues is the responsibility of other agencies, dealing with issues such as 
competition (Remington, 2005). 
South Africa must therefore pay careful attention to the way that its 
proposed walk-in rights provision is formulated, and perhaps also look into 
alternative mechanisms for balancing private versus public interests, 
whether as a substitute or complement to walk-in rights. In one context, 
the concept of such rights has already been partially institutionalised, as 
research funding agreements from DST and DST agencies typically now 
contain contractual provisions which give DST the right to take ownership 
of project intellectual property, should the PRO not commercialise such 
intellectual property within a specified time period. To date, no cases of 
DST having exercised such rights have come to light, although it is 
probably too early to draw any conclusions from this, as the time periods 
concerned have probably not yet elapsed. Policy statements indicate that 
government intends to exercise its walk-in rights actively. 
6.2.2.8 Failure to cater for development issues 
In light of the fact that the Draft Bill contains various provisions intended to 
promote public interest objectives, it is surprising that the Bill (and before 
that, the Framework on which it is based) makes no attempt to locate 
intellectual property in any sort of development context, despite this being a 
major focus internationally in several bilateral and multilateral fora. The 
Draft Bill makes no mention of socially responsible licensing, humanitarian 
use licensing or global access imperatives. The Bill also fails to deal with 
issues of open source and open access, and it does not make provision for 
donating technologies where this may be appropriate. These are some of 
the tools which progressive organisations and TTOs overseas are 
exploring in their efforts to leverage intellectual property for the public good, 
and which arguably could be usefully applied in South Africa. Cook-
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Deegan's message (2007: 154) has particular resonance for developing 
countries: 'Science is not just about creating knowledge, it is also about 
making it widely available and making it useful. Deliberate policies to 
promote open access and low-cost use enable some social benefits that 
profit-driven R&D cannot.' 
6.2.2.9 Lack of incentives for firms 
Finally, an overarching issue of concern relates to the 'technology push' 
focus, which emphasises the role of PROs and pays scant attention to that 
of firms, which are intended to be the vehicles for taking the PRO-
developed technologies to market. This appears to reflect a more 
widespread problem: the OECD Innovation Review (2007) identifies 
overemphasis on PROs and insufficient attention paid to firms as R&D 
performers as a general shortcoming of South Africa's innovation policy. 
The recent Innovation Survey (Department of Science and Technology, 
2007b) showed that firms assigned low importance to PROs as sources of 
innovation. The restrictive conditions laid down for technology transfer by 
the Draft Bill are likely to exacerbate this. It might thus be suggested that 
the policy framework requires a better balance between 'supply-side' 
(PRO) and 'demand-side' (firm) interventions. The IPR Framework 
acknowledges that SMMEs especially generally lack capacity to manage 
intellectual property effectively, yet the Draft Bill neglects to make any 
provision for addressing this, despite the fact that SMMEs are to receive 
preference as licensees. The OECD report on PRO patenting and 
technology transfer (2003) stresses the importance of aligning intellectual 
property policies with broader innovation policy. The proposed 
interventions do not appear to do this adequately. 
6.2.3 Possible unintended consequences to consider 
6.2.3.1 'Anti-Bayh-Dole' effects 
While in the USA Bayh-Dole sought to shift intellectual property ownership 
from the federal government to grantees, in order to incentivise PROs to 
transfer their technologies, and gave them the necessary autonomy to do 
so, the Draft Bill greatly strengthens government's rights in publicly 
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financed intellectual property, and confers upon government ownership 
rights that it has not previously enjoyed, while diluting PROs' rights in such 
intellectual property. As such, there is a danger that the Draft Bill, if 
enacted, might result in an outcome in South Africa which emulates the 
supposedly stagnant pre-Bayh-Dole situation in the USA more closely than 
the dynamic post-Bayh-Dole environment of vibrant technology transfer 
activity. 
6.2.3.2 Disruption to current technology transfer activities 
Both the IPR Framework and the Draft Bill appear to pay little attention to 
the fact that there is an existing South African technology transfer system, 
albeit a fledgling one, as a result of which their proposals seem to be aimed 
at setting up the relevant institutional infrastructure from scratch. No data 
is provided which indicates that efforts have been made on the part of the 
policymakers to understand properly the strengths and weaknesses of 
current operations, or to gauge the possible impact of the proposed 
changes. These could therefore be an impediment to the growth of the 
current system, by requiring a redirection of policies and processes. 
6.3 Recommendations 
The recommendations made here call for us to take a step back and 
reassess what is (a) needed and (b) feasible for a robust South African 
technology transfer system. It is submitted that by gathering data to fill in 
the informational gaps, and making room for more active participation by 
stakeholders representing different constituencies in the policy process, a 
solid foundation for future policy efforts can be constructed. 
~ Postponement of promulgation of legislation 
The discussion in section 6.2 suggests that legislation at this stage might 
be premature. It is therefore recommended that the legislative process is 
put on hold, at least for the time being, to allow for more participatory 
consultations to take place and for more evidence to be gathered to inform 
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appropriate policy choices, as well as to avoid bringing into effect a regime 
which might unintentionally constrain development of the South African 
technology transfer system and lead to unintended consequences. 
While a persuasive argument for the necessity of legislation has yet to be 
supplied, in the event that this approach continues to be pursued, a broad 
enabling statute, as envisaged in the Framework, could avoid many of the 
potential pitfalls which have been discussed. This would require that its 
scope be limited to setting out broad principles, while allowing sufficient 
flexibility to institutions to manage their internal affairs according to their 
own policies, procedures and institutional culture. The legislation can then 
be usefully supplemented with guidelines of good practice, which can be 
taken up by institutions to the extent that this is appropriate, together with a 
package of incentives to reward institutions which follow the preferred 
government approach. Government's role in the process should be to 
enable and assist, rather than to prescribe . 
.,. Introduction of a more consultative, inclusive and consensual 
process 
Many stakeholders perceive the IPR Framework and the Draft Bill as 'top-
down' initiatives of government. While assurances from DST43 to the effect 
that extensive redrafting is taking place are encouraging, no dialogue has 
been reopened with stakeholders since comments on the Draft Bill were 
submitted, and it is not clear whether a broader perspective, taking into 
account a greater variety of policy options, is being considered. 
One suggestion for bringing stakeholders into the process could be via 
revisiting the merits of a policy process in which a Green Paper and a 
White Paper precede the introduction of legislation.44 This route was 
typically followed in the second half of the 1990's, when a plethora of new 
43 Via personal communication from DST officials. 
44 A Green Paper would typically be a consultative document setting out policy proposals 
for discussion by stakeholders, while the White Paper would contain firm 
recommendations for action, based on responses to the Green Paper proposals. The 
recommendations would finally be incorporated into legislation. 
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policies was formulated to guide South Africa's transformation under the 
new democratic non-racial government, but more recently has become an 
exception to the rule. The process allowed debate on a suite of policy 
options presented in the Green Paper to inform the recommendations 
incorporated into the White Paper for implementation via legislation and 
other instruments. While it is believed that significant further work is 
needed to craft an appropriate policy and that taking this approach would 
greatly assist in the process, it is nonetheless acknowledged that it is highly 
unlikely that DST would be willing to be seen to 'go back to the drawing 
board' in this way, at this relatively advanced stage of the process. 
Other options for consensus-building can however be considered, which 
facilitate the combination of knowledge, experience and perceptions of 
different stakeholders. It is worth taking note of the Danish decision to 
establish a working group of practitioners to develop guidelines for 
implementation of the legislation. If DST were to adopt a similar approach, 
the prospects for buy-in by South African PRO TTOs are likely to improve. 
Similarly, detailed recommendations in France, which were compiled by 
representatives of government, industry and PROs, served to assist with 
implementation by providing guidance to PROs as they developed their 
own policies. Ideally, different government agencies and departments, 
technology transfer practitioners and industry would be represented in a 
South African working group. A suitable DST agency could provide a 
secretariat and co-ordination support. 
~ Collection of data to support the proposed policy positions 
With the exception of the information presented on South African patenting 
performance,45 the IPR Framework does not contain data to support its 
proposals. While the series of background reports commissioned by the 
Canadian Expert Panel to inform its work provides food for thought (ACST, 
45 Even this data was subject to questions about its interpretation during the public 
consultations in 2006. 
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1999),46 apparently South Africa is not alone in this respect, taking into 
account the OECD (2003: 1 0) observation that 'the lack of empirical data 
has clouded the policy debate'. As the earlier discussion demonstrates, 
though, better information could serve to lend authority to policy proposals, 
and to ensure that interventions are linked to real needs. It is thus 
proposed that an inventory of existing data be drawn up, and studies 
commissioned to fill in the gaps. While not intended to be an exhaustive 
list, some suggestions of areas for research to shed light on relevant issues 
might include: 
o Technology transfer activity and performance - both 
quantitative47 and qualitative (eg case studies) 
o The nature of the research enterprise in different PROs -
including the type of research taking place, expenditure on 
R&D, the funding mix and research partners 
o Researcher attitudes - including an assessment of the impact 
of existing and potential behaviour drivers, incentives and 
disincentives 
o The nature and extent of PRO-industry linkages - on the one 
hand, industry provides high levels of support for university 
research (OECD, 2007), while on the other, firms do not 
consider PROs an important source of innovation 
(Department of Science and Technology, 2007b). This 
apparent anomaly deserves further investigation 
o Inventories of public and private funding sources for different 
stages of technology transfer - and an assessment of funding 
gaps 
o Stakeholder surveys 
o Skills assessment - what is available and what is needed 
o Case studies. 
46 Amongst other things, these reports provided data on university technology transfer 
performance, stakeholder views, best practices, comparative approaches, program 
inventories, as well as a literature review. 
47 PRO annual reports to the Innovation Fund should contain relevant data in this regard, 
although it is noted that the format of the reports is unwieldy, which might make detailed 
analysis difficult. 
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'r Definition, prioritisation and/or segmentation of objectives 
Once a better understanding of existing conditions has been obtained, the 
policy objectives could then be revisited. Once a list of objectives has been 
agreed, a prioritisation exercise could take place. It has already been 
pointed out (section 6.2.27) that tension is created by trying to balance 
commercial and public interest or development objectives. It is therefore 
likely that trade-offs will be required. These will have to be carefully 
considered. 
Divergent policy trajectories could potentially be explored for different types 
of technology. Where issues such as health, food security and poverty 
elimination are concerned, a more 'pro-development' focus might be 
justified. Opportunities exist to develop technology transfer models, in 
which PROs and government agencies partner with industry, multilateral 
bodies and philanthropic foundations, to ensure that the transferred 
technologies are made accessible and affordable to the end users. For 
example, creative use of open source innovation models could be 
explored, humanitarian use licensing assured, or patent pools and clearing 
houses set up (Boettiger and Bennett, 2006). 
Where technology transfer opportunities fall more squarely into the 
commercial domain, provisions could be framed in such a way as to give 
licensees some assurance that their rights in the licensed technology will 
not arbitrarily be taken away or unduly diluted. Justifiable grounds for 
doing so can be stipulated in the applicable license agreements (eg failure 
to reach milestones, non-working of the licensed technology), and criteria 
under which government may exercise march-in or other rights should 
preferably be clearly spelled out upfront. In the latter situation, the public 
interest will be advanced through successful and sustained exploitation of 
PRO-derived technology by companies which contribute to the fiscus, 
create employment opportunities and enhance the competitiveness of local 
industry. As the Canadian Expert Panel notes in its discussion on 
maximizing the value of public investment in research (ACST, 1999: 14): 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
THE EVOLVING POLICY LANDSCAPE FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM PRO'S IN SOUTH AFRICA 
"Commercialization offices should ... endeavour to maximize the value of 
the companies they create. If they are successful in maximizing their 
clients' value, universities will maximize the economic and social returns to 
Canada as well as to themselves." 
Another alternative would be to consider sectoral technology transfer 
strategies. Valentin and Jensen's (2007) argument for a more nuanced 
approach in respect of the Danish experience should not be forgotten, 
namely that different fields of research and technology favour different 
strategies. Kaghan and Barnett (1997) similarly argue against a 'one-size-
fits-all' model, observing that the typical technology transfer model is 
founded on a linear understanding of the innovation process and that not 
all types of intellectual property are a good fit for this model. 
A couple of sectors might be selected to pilot tailored technology transfer 
strategies. The proposed DST grand challenges (Department of Science 
and Technology, 2007c) or funding agencies with a sectoral remit could be 
a good starting point in this regard. 
". Drafting of voluntary and consensual best practice guidelines 
Best practice guidelines, developed by consensus of the proposed 
stakeholder working group, could be a valuable tool not only to shape 
preferred technology transfer practices, but also to ensure stakeholder buy-
in, such stakeholders having contributed to the development of the 
guidelines. Guidance in this regard could be sought from similar 
documents developed elsewhere, including the QIPAP, the 'Nine Points to 
Consider in University Licensing' (2007), drawn up by leadership of 12 US 
universities,48 and the UK model contracts (Crown Copyright, 2003 and 
2007). It is proposed that sufficient flexibility be built in to such guidelines 
to accommodate differences in existing PRO policies and practices which 
conform to the guideline principles. 
48 Available at http://www.autm.netiaboutTT/Points to Consider.pdf (accessed 11 
February 2008). 
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To ensure that voluntary guidelines are not merely ignored, active 
encouragement of PROs to adopt the guidelines is likely to be necessary. 
NIPMO could playa vital role in providing implementation assistance to 
PROs by agreement. Eligibility for certain categories of funding might be 
tied to compliance. Compliance can also be governed by the terms of a 
funding agreement. Annual technology transfer activity reports from PROs 
should provide reasons for any deviations from the guidelines and 
chronicle both positive and negative experiences associated with the 
recommended practices. Furthermore, reviews of the effectiveness of the 
guidelines could be undertaken periodically and adjustments made when 
circumstances require this. 
y Agreement on technology transfer goals and appropriate 
benchmarks to monitor performance 
Once consensus is reached on technology transfer goals, appropriate 
indicators to track progress towards those goals can be determined. As 
discussed in section 1.5, this is not a trivial matter, and efforts will have to 
be made to avoid prioritising what is measurable over what is important. 
The development of a proper survey instrument that lends itself both to 
ease and uniformity of reporting and to data analysis could assist 
information gathering exercises. A central system that could be directly 
accessed by all PROs could be considered. TTOs could be required to 
report at regular intervals (probably annually).4B Based on these reports, a 
survey report could be produced regularly and disseminated to 
stakeholders and the general public, and raw data Could be made 
available for research on innovation and technology transfer. 
y Structuring of TTOs according to particular PRO needs 
Bearing in mind the diversity of PROs, different institutions will have 
different technology transfer needs. For example, it is difficult to justify the 
costs of setting up a 'full-service' no in a university with a small research 
base. But arguably all PROs will require some level of technology transfer 
49 Benchmark data and guideline compliance data could be combined in a single report to 
streamline the reporting process for TTOs. 
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capacity to facilitate contract negotiations, funding applications, MTAs, 
freedom-to-operate concerns, etc. Alternative models to provide the 
relevant service could be investigated, including a 'pre-licensing' model, 
which would focus more on upstream institutional support than on invention 
disclosures, patenting and licensing (Wolson, 2004), shared resources with 
other institutions, outsourcing or some combination of these. A rural 
university with close ties to the community, for example, might focus on 
technology transfer for social good rather than on high-tech patenting 
opportunities. 
At the same time, it is suggested that different policy and procedural 
provisions should be permitted, provided these do not depart too far from 
the best practice guidelines. 
". Further consideration of the question of intellectual property 
ownership 
The respective advantages of uniformity versus flexibility need to be 
weighed up. As the comparative country data in Chapter 4 showed, 
different positions have been taken in this regard. It is important to 
recognise at the outset that the ownership question has multiple 
dimensions, and should therefore be considered in turn in respect of 
government funders, researchers and industry. It is acknowledged that the 
predominant trend supports PRO ownership vis-a-vis government funding 
agencies and vis-a-vis researchers, offering consistency and simplicity. 
Although no directly comparable data is available in this regard, it is posited 
that vis-a-vis industry, there are many advantages in retaining the flexibility 
to negotiate according to the circumstances. 
To ensure that the benefits of uniformity are realised, true harmonisation 
across all government research funders will be important. The policy of 
certain agencies to insist on sharing the proceeds of successful technology 
transfer endeavours and to have approval or veto rights on 
commercialisation decisions should also perhaps be reconsidered. While 
these are not unreasonable or unique requirements in principle, they serve 
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to dilute the incentivising effect of PRO ownership. Bearing in mind that 
few funded projects are likely to generate significant returns, the costs of 
enforcing these rights might outweigh the benefits overall. Exceptions 
might be appropriate for technologies that offer special public interest 
benefits, where a more interventionist role for a funding agency might be 
justified. (In such cases, though, licensing income would typically be 
negligible.) Irrespective of the ownership and/or benefit-sharing rights of 
the funding agency concerned, NIPMO could be available to assist PROs 
by invitation. In a consensual system, partnerships in which expertise is 
pooled would be common. 
Concerning researchers, ownership of intellectual property at most South 
African PROs vests in the employing institution. There seem to be no 
obvious factors at play which would motivate towards changing this by 
adopting the Italian approach. The question then is whether the minority of 
PROs which give individuals ownership rights should be compelled to 
conform to the majority position. It is submitted that a consistent approach 
across all PROs would be desirable, as it would provide industry partners 
with certainty and reduce the risk of negotiations with a party who is not 
authorised to enter into the transaction concerned.50 If strong resistance 
were to be experienced, however, this might be reconsidered. The 
Canadian system is proof that despite dissatisfaction from some quarters 
with its laissez-faire approach, technology transfer may nonetheless 
proceed reasonably effectively without consistent rules. It is of interest to 
take note of an observation reported by Garduno (2004) that one of the few 
South African universities which did not claim ownership over its 
researchers' intellectual property (and which did not have a TTO at the 
time), in fact had one of the most successful track records in establishing 
spin-out companies. Further investigation of this could shed further light 
on the importance of the ownership debate. 
50 Most PROs deal from time to time with 'renegade' academics who enter into 
agreements with third parties (whether in defiance or ignorance) despite lacking the 
authority to do so. This can raise serious liability issues for the PRO. 
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As regards industry, the argument to retain flexibility has been put forward. 
While the guidelines may stipulate preferences, and require justification 
from departing from them, the bar to concluding a deal should not be set 
too high, as this could lead to loss of commercialisation opportunities. If 
rights are assigned to a company, it is strongly suggested that the PRO 
reserve a research exemption or a non-exclusive royalty-free license to 
practice the technology concerned for teaching and research purposes. 
". Assessment of the human resource needs for sustaining the 
technology transfer system 
While there is general acknowledgement that South African is desperately 
short of technology transfer skills, appropriate capacity-building 
programmes are not easy to design, and as requirements change over 
time, even customised courses and curricula might become redundant. 
Many of the technology transfer 'pioneers' overseas received no formal 
training, learning 'on-the-job'. Hands-on experience remains one of the 
most useful forms of learning, but more formal training opportunities are 
now available, including degree programmes and short courses. The 
Innovation Fund has launched internships for technology transfer 
practitioners and trainee patent attorneys, in conjunction with business and 
academic partners. The South African Research and Innovation 
Management Association and the Licensing Executives Society present 
courses from time to time. Internationally, AUTM's meetings and courses 
are well-established,51 and a multitude of other organisations offer their 
own programmes. As the South African technology transfer system 
matures, needs will change. If these are monitored on an ongoing basis, 
timely and appropriate responses can be facilitated. Mentorship and 
networking are invaluable tools and could be actively nurtured. 
". Inclusion of other key government departments as active 
participants in the process 
51 See www.autm.net. 
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Interventions which are the responsibility especially of the DoE and DTI 
respectively are crucial to the success of technology transfer activities. A 
more holistic approach to policy-making is therefore called for, capable of 
spanning across departments and overcoming the 'silo effect'. Active 
involvement of DoE and DTI representatives will be necessary for the 
development of a robust and effectively integrated policy framework. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The IPR Framework has been an important development in the process of 
raising awareness of the role of PROs in the South African NSI. It 
introduces some important principles, including the benefits of PRO 
ownership, the need to provide incentives to PRO researchers, the 
imperative to strike a balance between public and private interests, and 
perhaps most importantly, communicates strong government endorsement, 
and promises sustained government support, for PRO technology transfer. 
It has also served to open the public debate, although it is submitted that 
this is by no means exhausted, and ought to be continued. The OEeD 
Turning Science into Business report (2003) observes that one of the main 
benefits of a legislative approach over alternatives is its effectiveness in 
cultivating awareness of the issues associated with technology transfer 
within PROs. In the South African situation, it could be argued that the IPR 
Framework and Draft Bill have to a large extent already achieved this 
particular goal. While recognising that there will be an ongoing need for 
appropriate policy measures to maintain the momentum (and by no means 
asserting that 'the work is now done'), these could just as constructively 
take the form of smaller-scale, targeted, non-legislated programmes 
capable of responding with greater agility to specific needs, which might 
not remain constant over time. 
Broadly speaking, the main concerns with the Draft Bill, as discussed in 
section 6.2, relate to its unintended potentially disincentivising impact on 
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technology transfer. While it ostensibly aims to incentivise PROs and PRO 
researchers by empowering them to share in the proceeds of profitable 
commercialisation of their intellectual property, for the most part, this 
merely confirms the status quo, rather than introducing new benefits. 
Furthermore, the added obligations and strictures placed on PROs by the 
Draft Bill raise transaction costs and erode institutional autonomy. The 
Draft Bill does not provide incentives to industry to pursue the 
commercialisation of new technologies developed at PROs, and could 
have the effect of removing some of the existing flexibilities available to 
negotiate ownership rights to intellectual property with PROs. Limitations 
on license term and exclusivity which appear in the Draft Bill, coupled with 
the powers of the State to revoke patents and license agreements, greatly 
increase the risk for potential licensees wishing to access PRO intellectual 
property or technology. 
It can be argued that the limitations proposed by the Draft Bill might be 
justified if the policy framework were located more clearly in a 'pro-
development' context, and if it aimed more explicitly to promote 
development objectives, prioritising technology transfer for social good over 
economic development, through the inclusion of specific provisions instead 
of the ill-defined yet wide-ranging general powers conferred on 
government. However, as discussed in section 6.2.2.8, this is not explicitly 
motivated in the policy discussions or documents. 
So, while the envisaged legislation might succeed in improving the 
patenting activity of PROs, thereby ensuring that PRO intellectual property 
is better protected (and even this will require overcoming various 
obstacles), it is not clear that it is able to provide for the more effective 
transfer of this intellectual property to industry, to develop it into products 
and services to generate wealth, create jobs and enhance quality of life. 
This dissertation suggests that the potential risks posed by the draft 
legislation could be averted with relative ease, by adopting a more cautious 
process, in which policy recommendations are informed by evidence, and a 
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more consensual approach, taking into account the wide range of views, 
interests and experience of different stakeholders. As such, it is hoped that 
DST's efforts to legislate in this sphere will be reconsidered, or at the very 
least, that the scope be significantly reduced. An alternative approach 
could consist of incorporating the principles and proposed practices 
enshrined in the Draft Bill (preferably with modifications to take into account 
some of the criticisms) into Guidelines of Good Practice. NIPMO could 
then collaborate with PROs to implement the appropriate changes, monitor 
the progress and amend the guidelines where this is called for. Incentives 
(such as access to certain forms of funding) could be offered for 
compliance. Success stories could be shared and lessons learned from 
unsuccessful efforts. Different approaches could be considered for 
different industry sectors. This would provide a strong platform for 
implementing better informed legislation in the future, or other means of 
policy reform. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, without a better understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of current South African PRO technology 
transfer efforts, policy measures run the risk of being misguided or 
misdirected. Methodologically sound studies commissioned by DST could 
generate the necessary quantitative and qualitative data on technology 
transfer actual, perceived and desired performance, to validate or disprove 
some of the unsubstantiated assumptions underlying the current policy, to 
clarify and either prioritise or segment objectives, and ensure that a revised 
policy can stand on a more stable foundation and be more responsive to 
real needs. 
Most important too, is not to lose sight of the fact that technology transfer is 
just one modality for strengthening linkages in the NSI, and without 
concurrently addressing other constituents of the system, the impact even 
of well-structured initiatives will be negligible. 
Ultimately, for a policy of this nature to succeed in its quest, the benefits 
must be experienced by all stakeholders. Visible examples of successful 
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licensing endeavours are necessary to prove the value of and to sustain 
PRO technology transfer activities. As the Canadian Expert Panel notes 
(ACST,1999:14): 
Success breeds success. If firms licensing technologies from universities 
improve their competitiveness standing, they will continue to seek out 
innovations from ... universities and fund university research. If investors 
providing seed capital to emerging spin-off companies obtain a healthy 
return on their investments, they will continue to support the establishment 
and growth of new companies. If universities and their researchers obtain 
a fair share of the overall wealth they help create, they will have a vested 
interest in launching additional commercial undertakings. And, if the public 
witnesses the creation of well-paying jobs and improved social conditions 
as a result of university research, it will support ongoing public investments 
in this area. 
Of course, the converse applies too, and roleplayers who fail to enjoy the 
conditions mentioned above will not continue to participate, dooming any 
associated policies to failure. The immediate South African challenge is 
therefore to generate 'success stories' to sow the seeds of support. The 
fact that these are so few and far between at present demonstrates the 
need for new policy interventions. By paying closer attention to the 
growing body of experience, both locally and overseas, by cultivating a 
better understanding of our own unique conditions, and by applying this 
learning appropriately, we should be well-placed to craft an adapted policy 
targeted at our specific needs and able to meet its goals. 
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